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Chapter I .  
An Introduction to Urbanization in Latin America 
Introduction 
The study of urbanization, or more specifically the rural-urban 
migration process,  has taken many forms . Analyses of Latin American 
urbanization have ranged from tightly designed empirical work, most 
of which has appeared in the last ten years,  to theorizing on the nature 
of man in urban society, with more or less loosely organized secondary 
source investigations filling the continuum between these two extremes .  
Unfortunately political scientists were probably the last to join the 
other social scientists in the study of urbanization. However, now 
that the political perspective is beginning to receive more attention, 
the empirical base of urbanization studies has been expanded, pri-
marily at the earlier theorists' expense .  That is , a few of today ' s  
new crop of political scientists are collecting data and producing 
evidence which is already making a shambles of "urban-instability" 
theories that grew out of the work of Robert E .  Park, Louis Wirth, 
and others from the early "Chicago School" of urban sociology . 1 
This paper will center on one aspect of the debate concerning 
the roots of urban instability with the somewhat lofty aim of clarify-
ing and consequently analyzing the polarized views which have arisen. 
1 See R. E .  Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man, "  American 
Journal of Sociology , 3 (May, 1928) , 881-893; and L.  Wirth, "Urbanism 
as a Way of Life" in A. J .  Reiss (ed . ) ,  Louis Wirth on Cities and Social 
Life (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
1 
2 
The primary concern of this writer will be to focus on the political 
attitudes and behavior of rural migrants once they reach the city. To 
put it very simply, this writer wants to know if the migrants become 
politically radicalized. 
Generally the time span of this paper will include the period 
from 1930 to present; however ,  primary emphasis (particularly in the 
case studies of Mexico, Venezuela , and Chile) will be placed in the 
period during the 19SO ' s  and 1960 ' s .  
Before proceeding further , it might be best to clarify the meaning 
of some of the more important terms which will continually reappear 
throughout the following discussion. For this writer ' s  purposes the 
term political radicalization will assume a rather broad meaning in 
that it will imply migrant attitu4es and , more importantly, behavior 
committed to maj or alterations of the existing political structure . 
Obviously then, this definition includes support of extreme reactionary 
movements ,  such as Peronism in Argentina, as well as the more classic 
radicalism indicated by support of Communist and other extreme left­
wing movements. Determinants of political radicalism will be the extent 
to which nonsupportive attitudes are distributed through the populace 
and the extent to which such feelings are actually translated into be­
havior contributing to conditions of political instability. 
The primary ind:Sx· for political radicalism will be preference 
and support for radical political parties on the basis of ideology• 
Table 1 .  indicates what parties this writer will type as radical within 
the Latin American context . Because of the constantly changing nature 
of the Latin American political party system, this table should not be 
3 
strictly adhered to·. For example, as in the case of Mexico's one-
party dominated system, when a party generally typed as non-radical, 
Table 12 
Latin American Party Types I By Ideology 
Ideology Type Example 
Non- Conservative Chilean United Conservative 
Radical Party (PCU) 
Liberal Liberal Party of Chile (PL) 
Radical Radical Party of Chile (PR) 
Christian Demo- Chilean Christian Democratic 
crat or Christian Party (PDC) 
Socialist 
Radical Socialist Socialist Party of Chile (PS) 
Communist Chilean Communist Party (PCCH) 
Populist Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) 
Personalist Peron ' s  party in Argentina 
(Partido Peronista) 
becomes a relevant opposition force to the existing system it should , 
in that case, be classified as radical . Also there are parties which 
have not been historically consistently radical or non-radical. An ex-
/ / 
ample is the Aprista party Accion Democratica in Venezuela which served 
as a radical political force from 1948 to 1957, but today represents 
the elected government . However, this table will generally serve as an 
acceptable guideline for measuring political radicalism by party identi-
f ication . 
2see Martin Needler , Latin American Politics in Perspective , 
(Princeton, N . J . : Van Nostrand , 1963) , 88-111. 
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Continuing with the clarification of terms, political instability is 
defined as a state of conflict between governments and (competing) 
power groups which is characterized by overt acts of violence, by support 
for extreme political radicalism, or by apathy in the face of movements 
Table 23 




High rate of economic growth Democracy Dictatorship 
Equal income distribution 
High political capability 
Broad-based institutionalized Continue as No increase in coercion 
political parties democracy with option available 




Low rate of economic growth Democracy Dictatorship 
Unequal income distribution 
Low political capability 
Narrow personalistic Inflation decentral- Inflation, increase 
political parties ized violence, mili- in level of coer-
tary intervention, cion, decentralized 
social revolution violence, social 
revolution 
3Ernest A .  Duff and John F .  Mccamant, "Measuring Social and Political 
Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," The American Political 
Science Review, (December 1968) , 1126. 
5 
which are committed to extreme dislocations of the established power 
structure. Generally political instability is more likely to occur when 
the governing institutions of organized society are relatively inef fec-
tive in gratifying popular wants and expectations . _ Obviously this 
definition is so broad that it may be said that no country in Latin 
America is completely free from political instability. 
In this sense, probably the best that can be done is to rank on a 
comparative basis those countries which will be dealt with most fre-
quently. Table 2 summarizes the criteria for stability ranking. On 
this basis Table 3 lists the relative scores of those countries most 
4 Table 3 
System Stability Scores 
Country System Stability 
High 
Stability Chile + .75 
Brazil + .18 
Peru + .04 
Venezuela .03 
Argentina - .04 
Mexico .36 
Colombia - .36 
important to our discussion. 
Political alienation is closely related to political instability 
in that a failure of governments to gratify popular wants leads to 
4Ernest A.  Duff and John F .  Mccamant,  "Measuring Social and Poli­
tical Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," The American 
Political Science Review , (December 1968) , 1138. 
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political alienation in varying degrees of intensity. A deeply felt 
resentment toward social and governing institutions is usually charac-
teristic of this kind of alienation; and , at times , these feelings may 
be so intense as to be manifested in happenings which contribute to 
political instability. In this sense it may be said that political 
alienation is a necessary condition for political instability, but not 
necessarily vice-versa . 
Another term closely linked to political instability is relative 
deprivation, which one writer says is a necessary precondition for civil 
strife of any kind. 5 Relative deprivation is not whatever the outside 
observer thinks people ought to be dissatisfied with. It is a state of 
mind that can be defined as a discrepancy between people's expectations 
about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably 
entitled , on the one hand and on the other their value capabilities, 
that is what they perceive to be their chances for getting and keeping 
those goods and conditions. 
Finally , anomie is another term which has begun to appear quite 
frequently in discussions concerning political instability. Anomie is 
defined as the lack of stable cognitive orientations to a changed situa-
tion, and may take the form of a significant decline in religious 
participation, a high divorce rate, a loss of both trust and a sense of 
cohesion in interpersonal relations . Generally an anomic response to 
urban life is indicative of a breakdown of traditional norms , value 
systems , and social controls which may in turn lead to an increased 
5Ted Gurr , "Urban Disorder : .Perspectives from the Comparative 
Study of Civil Strife,"  American Behavioral Scientist, 11 (March­
April, 1968), 50.  
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potential for supporting extremist movements. 
J .  Clyde Mitchell refers to urbanization as the process of becoming 
urban , moving to cities, changing from agriculture· to other pursuits 
common to cities, and correspondant change of behavior patterns . 6 Along 
the same lines, it appears that the customary characterization of rural­
urban migration involves a farm resident moving to the city. 7 However , 
in the Latin American context this definition must be refined to indi-
cate that this movement is rarely direct. Generally , this movement 
occurs in stages where the migrant goes first from the farm to a small 
town, and then to a larger town, and ultimately to the city. 8 In any 
case, it is clear that rural-urban migration is an integral part of the 
urbanization process. 
Certainly little time need be spent in j ustifying the study of 
Latin American urbanization. In almost all of the countries of this 
area, urbanization has been one of the maj or social phenomena of the 
late nineteenth and the twentieth century . It has been pointed out that : 
There is no Latin American country in which there has 
been a trend away from urbanization ; everywhere the impres­
sive fact has been the movement toward the city, the 
swelling of urban populations. This trend has given rise 
to what is sometimes referred to as the problem of ' la 
cabeza de Goliat ' (Goliath ' s  head) , characterizing a 
country in which a giant urban head rests upon a dwarf­
like rural body . This situation is most acute in Cuba and 
Uruguay , where more than half the national populations live 
in the metropolitan areas of Havana and Montevideo; Argentina, 
6wilbert E .  Moore and Neil J .  Smelser (eds . ) ,  Urbanization in Newly 
Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs , N .J . :  Prentice-Hall, Inc . ,  1966) , 
5 .  
7Bruce H .  Herrick, Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile 
(Cambridge, Mass . :  The M. I . T .  Press, 1965) , 10. 
8Evidence supporting this statement will be presented in chapter III. 
8 
where a little more than one-fourth of the people are 
located in Greater Buenos Aires ; and Venezuela , where 
approximately 20 percent of the population lives in 
Caracas . • • • 9 
One writer states that the rate of urbanization in Latin America 
is higher than that of any other underdeveloped region in the world . 
He observes that while the projected figures for the Latin American 
countries as a whole indicate an annual increase in population of from 
2 . 5  to 2 . 8  percent for the next fifteen years , it is estimated that 
during the same period Latin American cities will add some 4 . 2  to 5 
percent to their population each year . 10 The following data (See 
Table 4) give some idea of the contribution migration is making to 
Table 411 
Percentage of the total urban population growth due to natural 
increase and to migration during the last intercensal 
periods for selected countries 
Country Intercensal Approximate percentage of the urban 
period growth due to 
Natural increase Migration 
Venezuela 1941-50 29 71 
Colombia 1938-51 32 68 
Dominican 
Republic 1935-51 35 65 
El Salvador 1930-50 46 54 
Brazil 1940-50 51 49 
Chile 1940-52 53 47 
Mexico 1940-50 58 42 
Cuba 1931-43 74 26 
9 ' George I .  Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America" in Gabriel 
A.  Almond and James S .  Coleman (eds . ) , The Politics of the Developing 
Areas (Princeton , J .J . :  Princeton University Press , 1960) , 470 . 
10c .M. Harr, "Latin America ' s  Troubled Cities," Foreign Affairs, 41 
(3) (April 1963) , 540. 
llPhilip M. Hauser, Urbanization in Latin America, (New York: 
International Documents Service, 1961) , 110. 
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urban growth in selected Latin American countries. The facts speak 
for themselves that the study of urbanization and its attendent pro-
blems is crucial to an understanding of Latin American political 
instability . 
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the central 
problem this writer proposes to deal with, it might first be helpful 
to present some general historical and theoretical information con-
cerning the urbanization process in Latin America. 
General History and Theory of 
Latin American Urbanization 
The earliest cities in Latin America grew out of the urban 
colonization of western South America during the sixteenth century.  
Systematic exploration, colonization, and urbanization began with the 
arrival of Francisco Pizarro ' s  expedition on the northern coast of 
Peru in 1532. The following half-century was the formative period 
of urban ecology of the region. By 1582 a pattern of cities covered 
the arable and otherwise useful areas of Peru, Ecuador , and Bolivia , 
with parts of Chile, Argentina , and Colombia. 
There are several reasons for the creation of these new citie s .  
Charles V and Philip I I ,  who ruled Spain during the sixteenth-century 
colonization of Peru, showed constant interest in the founding of 
towns , and it is suggested that their special favor was to be con-
12 ferred on those who were successful at this aspect of the enterprise. 
12Ralph A.  Gakenheimer , "The Peruvian City of the Sixteenth 
Century ," in Glenn H .  Beyer (ed . ) , The Urban Explosion in Latin 
America (Ithaca , N .Y . : Cornell University Press, 1967), 37 . 
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The purpose of collective worship has been a cause for the gathering 
of people in various periods of history, and religious leaders have 
at times encouraged urbanism as a means of keeping people within 
the reach of doctrine and discipline . In addition towns were often 
founded as an obvious and necessary establishment for defense of the 
settlers . Finally the city offered hope of a means of income to 
those without livelihood. With immigrants arriving in large numbers, 
many destitute but convinced that the colonies offered great oppor­
tunity , there were large numbers of vagrants in the cities who con­
stituted a drain on the economy and a potentially dangerous group 
in search of military and political involvement . The creation of 
new towns to entice these people from the existing ones and cause 
them to be profitably engaged was an obvious remedy to the situation . 
Of course , the list goes on and on, but the preceding renders some 
insight into the reasons for city growth in Latin America. 
There appear to have been three main stages of urbanization in 
Latin America following the initial period of Spanish and Portuguese 
colonization. The first of these stages was a time of consolidating 
colonial institutions and establishing the structure of colonial 
society. This stage, which roughly covers the period from the early 
1600 ' s  to the early 1800 ' s ,  saw no deep changes disturbing the general 
pattern. The principal centers from which the colonies were adminis­
tered were consolidated . Only a few centers acquired importance and 
presented some urban aspect , chiefly those in which commercial activi­
ties and religious, administrative, military , and cultural institutions 
11 
were concentrated. Thus the continental importance o� Lima , Mexico 
City, and Bahia, and the regional importance of Havana , Rio de Janeiro, 
Buenos Aires, Caracas , Santiago , Bogota , and other center s ,  were defined. 
During the second stage, covering the last half of the nineteenth 
century and the early years of the twentieth century , immigration from 
Europe was the chief factor of change. Latin American cities that grew 
during this period , according to one v�ewpoint, were those in a posi­
tion to profit from the prevailing economic advantages. Buenos Aires, 
for example, grew because it was outward-looking, European, dynamic, 
and economically active. 
During the last stage, the one we are now living in , the long 
delayed incorporation of rural groups has sent these groups to the 
cities. This·period has seen the growth, faster than before, of the 
few industrial centers of each country; at the same time, the popula­
tion of the rural towns and areas has decreased . Furthermore,· this 
process has been greatly accelerated in the past ten to twenty years 
as the deteriorating .rural sector has become a most significant cause 
for movement to urban centers. 
This mass movement to the city has had enormous social , economic , 
and political implications . From the standpoint of poli�ical implica­
tions these large masses, transplanted in short order to the cities, 
transformed suddenly from rural peons,  artisans , or persons with hard­
ships into industrial workers, acquired political significance without 
at the s�me time finding the institutional channels necessary for inte­
grating themselves into the normal functioning of the political 
12 
system. 13 
Some analysts have argued that the situation described in the 
preceding paragraph has been quite important in creating social unrest 
14 which in turn produces system instability in Latin America. On the 
other hand , there has also been strong evidence provided that this 
combination of working class mobilization without any corresponding 
class integration, far from adding to social unrest,  gave great support 
to the middle classes . 15 One of the primary purposes of this paper is 
to analyze both of these arguments in order to gain some insight into 
the political process in Latin America . First , however, it should be 
beneficial to briefly look at the recent historical role that migrants J 
have played in the urban political process. 
The masses of the urban poor have always participated to some 
extent in the political life of the cities and republics. Politicians 
sought their support, particularly where their support was channeled 
through a labor movement. However, it appears tha t ,  in most cases , 
new urban poor have had the effect of bursting the bounds of any already 
existing labor movements and similarly destroying much of the unity of 
style of the smaller and older proletariat. 16 Thus it could be con-
13 For a broad presentation of this theory see William Kornhauser, The 
Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill . :  The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959) . 
14For example see Kenneth F .  Johnson ,  "Causal Factors in Latin 
American Political Instability , "  Western Political Quarterly, 3 (Sept . ,  
1964) , 432-446 . 
15John J .  Johnson, Political Change in Latin America : The Emergence 
of the Middle Sectors (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1958) , 41-42. 
l6E . J .  Hobsbawn , "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics" in 
Claudia Veliz (ed . ) �  The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967) , 5 9 .  
13 
eluded that the new urban poor have actually aided the process of 
depolitization in Latin America. Furthermore, it may well be that 
the unorganized activities of the laboring poor, such as riots, have 
had a similar effect . Hobsbawn points out that it is remarkable how 
few riots - even food riots - there have been in the great Latin 
American cities during periods when the mass of �heir impoverished 
and economically deprived inhabitants multiplied . 17 " the last 
great riot of the unaided poor in Bogota (student-initiated riots are 
another matter) occurred in 1948, since then the population of the 
city - and it is fair to say the body of misery it contains - has 
risen from less than 650 , 000 (1951) to over a million (1964) . 1118 
Of course the rural influx also affects the pattern of political 
parties and votes . It could easily be argued that the characteristic 
populist leaders and parties of the 1940 ' s  and 1950's, whatever their 
claim to national and rural interest, represented primarily movements 
based on the urban poor, and hence, increasingly, new internal migrants. 
Certainly this is clearly the case of Argentina, where Per�n deliber-
ately made himself the spokesman of the creole up-country migrants 
against the European and cit�fied natives of Buenos Aires . The poli-
ticians who have succeeded in gaining the support of the urban masses 
vary widely in their personalities or political attitudes. They might 
17E .  J .  Hobsbawn, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics" 
in Claudia Veliz (ed . ) , The Politics of Conformity in Latin America 
(London : Oxford University Press, 1967) , 60.  
18Ibid. 
14 
be old-fashioned oligarchs or generals who gained a reputation for 
helping the people by lavish patronage, or the provision of work, 
or the right kind of building, or who were merely lucky enough to 
coincide with a period of exceptional prosperity. 
Perhaps what the preceding points out most clearly is that the 
new urban masses are rarely the political organizers , but instead 
19 generally those who are organized and manipulated . The only clear 
, 
case to the contrary is that of Colombia, where Gaitan's assassination 
was followed by a formidable and entirely spontaneous rising of the 
Bogota poor . But the situation which developed in Colombia between 
1934 and 1948 was so clearly one of potential - and not merely urban -
social revolution from below that normal criteria hardly apply to i t .  
Nonetheless , it should not b e  concluded that because of the 
apparent lack of initiative of the new urban masses that they might 
not still provide an important potential source for political radi-
calism in Latin America. Indeed the fact that these urban masses are 
apparently so easily manipulated by oligarchs and generals , who know . 
how to transform their potential into effective action, may render 
them all the more of an explosive destabilizing force.  This being the 
case, it appears more information is needed before any conclusions 
may be reached . In this respect, it may aid the reader to have a more 
general knowledge of the rural-urban migration process. Primarily, 
the focus will be on causes for the migration phenomenon in order. to 
l9see Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structures and 
Political Institutions (Berkeley : University of California Press, 
1967) , 191; and Hobsbawn in Veliz , op . cit . , 63. 
15 
hopefully shed light on its effects. 
Two sorts of pressures have been hypothesized which could lead 
to migration from a rural setting to an urban one". 20 The first has 
usually been called the "push. "  The pressure of rural poverty, under 
this hypothesis, pushes the farmer off the land . It seems that the 
tendency in Latin American studies is to emphasize the push factors : 2 1  
the lack of opportunity for change in status ; t�e displacement of 
functions by rapid farm mechanization; the high degree of soil exhaus-
tion in many areas; the ineffective administration, marketing , and 
servicing facilities in rural areas. 22 Explanations for rural poverty 
generally focus on low agricultural productivity, which in turn is 
blamed on lack of education and energy of the cultivators, or on land 
tenure arrangements that fail to provide incentives for capital improve-
ments, or on government price policies that discourage investment in 
agriculture . Whatever the correct cause, or combination of causes, for 
low agricultural productivity, the result is still the same . Low 
incomes in agriculture push farmers out of their rural pursuits and 
into the only alternatives that exist for them : the town and the city. 
The second type of pressure on would-be migrants is the "pull" 
of more attractive urban opportunities. Generally these opportunities 
are defined as job opportunities or chances for increased pay. How-
ever , it has been pointed out that the flow to cities is a good deal 
2°For a general discussion of this point see Herrick, op. cit., 13-15. 
21 
Irving Louis Horowitz ,  "Electoral Politics , Urbanization, and 
Social Development in Latin America," in Beyer , op. cit . ,  224. 
22see, for example, Andrew G. Frank, "Urban Poverty in Latin 
America," Studies in Comparative International Development , Vol. II , 
1966 , 76.  
16 
greater than real opportunities for sta�le employment or adequate 
housing. 23 Thus the attraction to the city cannot be attributed to 
industrial growth alone. This "lure" is undoubtedly linked to such 
things as the desire to give children the advantages of education, 
health and welfare, general culture , etc. In addition such factors 
as opportunities for entertainment, marriage, or even crime have been 
considered by some theorists.24 To sum up, it seems clear that the 
causes for rural-urban migration may be explained through some com-
bination of the "push" and "pull" hypotheses. At this point the main 
purposes of this paper may be stated . In addition the hypotheses and 
method of approach will also be presented. 
Statement of Purpose 
This paper has several purposes which are: (1) to present the 
theories and evidence which point to the rural-urban migrants as an 
important source of political radicalism in Latin America; (2) to 
present the evidence of those who argue that the preceding theories 
are based on unconfirmed generalizations and are in fact inadequate 
as explanatory devices; (3) to broaden the horizons of this kind of 
study by analyzing the Latin American rural-urban migration process 
in selected country studies (specifically this will focus on the 
migrant ' s  relation to the electoral process in these countries and 
23Horowitz in Beyer , op. cit . ,  224 .  
24samuel A .  Stouffer , "Intervening Opportunities : 
Relating Mobility and Distance ," American Sociological 
No. 6 (Dec . ,  1940), 845-867. 
A Theory 
Review, Vol. 5 ,  
17 
his propensity to engage in radical political activity through this 
process) ; and finally (4) to propose a more constructive theory to 
explain the migrant ' s  propensity for radical activity. 
In a more general context it is hoped that this paper will pro­
vide some organization and continuity to a previously widely scattered 
body of knowledge which renders itself useful to'the study of political 
instability in Latin America. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
1 .  Rural-urban migration does breed a certain amount of economic 
frustration and will continue to breed even more frustration in the 
future. However, at present the amount of economic frustration as a 
result of this process is much less than some "urban-instability 
theorists" would have us believe. 
The main problem with the "economic frustration" thesis is that 
it apparently does not account for the fact t�at although economically 
the.migrant may still have problems in his new urban environment, they 
are generally not as severe as those he had before he moved. 
It may be true that the economic frustration that does result is 
generally a product of a situation where urbanization is proceeding at 
a faster rate than industrialization ; however , there doesn ' t  appear to 
be any way of testing this. 
2 .  Rural-urban migrants generally have few problems with socio­
psychological adjustment. 
There is virtually no evidence that supports the proposition that 
migrants encounter difficulties in making a successful mental adjustment 
18 
to the urban setting . 
3 .  Because there is not really a great amount of economic frustration 
among rural-urban migrants and because they have few socio-psychological 
adjustment problems, alienation from the political system is not 
generally characteristic of this group. 
Most of the problems the migrant is faced with are quite indivi­
dual , and thus rarely does he relate his needs to the system as a whole. 
However , this situation is not likely to remain static in the future . 
As urban educational opportunities continue to increase ,  so too will 
the number of politically aware migrants. This increased political 
awareness cannot help but lead to greater system awareness. 
4 .  A study of migrant voting behavior reveals that recent migrants , 
in this respect, tend to be no more politically radical than the re­
maining rural residents in the areas migrated from. 
In a historical sense the preceding statement may also be true 
for the period roughly from 1930 to 1950. However what is significant 
for this period is that both the rural and ex-rural masses played a re­
latively important role in the radicalization of Latin .American poli­
tics, reflected in various successful and abortive revolutions and 
changes of regimes. Presently neither group appears to be displaying 
much of the potential radicalizing effect they still possess . This 
suggests a theory based on stages , and will be pursued further in the 
preceding chapters. 
5. On the basis of the preceding hypotheses, it does not appear that , 
at present, recent rural-urban migrants are likely to engage ·in radical 
19 
political activity. (This situation, however, will probably change 
in the not too distant future . )  
Method of Approach 
Two basic methods will be used for this paper . The first will 
consist of gathering and organizing available mat�rial in periodical 
articles , papers, and books in such a form to proyide evidence to 
test my hypotheses. In addition, in the chapter whic� deals with 
migrant voting patterns there will be an attempt to interpret "raw" 
election data in order to better ascertain the political behavior of 
the new urban masses. Unquestionably the greatest limitation of this 
study is the fact that it will not be possible to conduct new surveys , 
and thus there will be almost total dependence on data gathered and , 
in most cases , interpreted by other writers. In this regard it should 
be pointed out that only recently have there begun to appear solid 
empirical studies dealing with or related to this topic. Obviously, 
this too is a limiting factor. 
In the next chapter the "radical migrant" theories and evidence 
relating to them will be presented. 
Chapter II 
Theories and Evidence Concerning the Radical 
Migrants and Marginals 
Theories proposing the political radicalization of new urban 
residents have been with us a long time . Plutarch and Livy, writing 
of the mob violence and riots in Rome during the close of the Re-
public, noted that the source of trouble rested with the recent 
migrants - the rural population that was leaving the land and flock­
ing to the city. 25 Recently the list of articles asserting this 
general proposition has grown considerably longer and the prophecies 
of some have taken on more ominous dimensions . One writer presents 
the case particularly forcefully saying that: 
"All over the world , often long in advance of effec­
tive industrialization, the unskilled poor are streaming 
away from subsistence agriculture to exchange the squalor 
of rural poverty for the even deeper miseries of the 
shanty-towns , "favellas" ,  and 'bidonvilles' that , year 
after year, grow inexorably on the fringes of ·developing 
c ities • • • • •  Unchecked , disregarded , left to grow and 
fester, there is here enough explosive material to pro­
duce in the world at large the pattern of a bitter class 
conflict finding to an increasing degree a racial basis , 
erupting in guerilla warfare , and threatening , ultimately 
the security even of the comfortable West . 112° 
It is interesting that the approach taken in developing the 
"radical migrant" theory is rarely the same . Some, operating within 
25Peter Lupsha , "On Theories of Urban Violence , "  presented at the 
American Political Science Association meetings in 1968, 6 .  
26Barbara Ward , "The Uses of Prosperity , "  Saturday Review, August 
29 , 1964 , 191. 
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a Marxist framework, see the new urban masses a s  the core o f  the 
proletariat movement in the revolution to free colonized people s . 27 
Others focus on the political system and the increasing burdens put 
upon it by the process of social mobilization of the migrants.28 But 
no matter what the approach , the general conclusion is the same - the 
frustrated and disoriented migrants are a sure source of political 
radicalism and therefore likely to produce system instability. 
From the various approaches there have resulted two basic "radical 
migrant" theories .  The first focuses on the new migrants as the radical 
source while the other proposes that the threat to political stability 
lies not with newcomers , but with those frustrated slum dwellers who are 
long-term urban residents , or even with the second generation . In order 
to simplify our terminology , we will hereafter refer to the new migrants 
(those with ten or less years of urban residence) as the migrant s .  The 
longer-term urban residents (those with ten to twenty years of urban 
residence) will be referred to as the marginals . In the following pages 
these two theories will be treated in turn. 
The Migrant Radical: Theories 
For the purposes of this paper theories concerning the migrants 
may be reduced to three general themes. 
1 .  The economic frustration theory proposes that migrants have 
27For example , see Franz Fannon, The Wretched of the Earth , (New 
York: Grove Press, Inc . ,  1963) , 103 . 
28see Rarl W .  Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Develop­
ment ," The American Political Science Review, LV, No.,.3 (Sept . ,  1961) , 497 .  
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high economic aspirations when they arrive, but generally fail to 
participate in the material rewards of urban society. This, it is 
argued , produces a "frustration gap" between high expectations and 
the ability to fulfill them which results both from the inadequate 
premigration preparation of the migrants and the inability of urban 
government and private enterprise to accommodate them. 29 Migrants 
are deficient in both the skills to earn a living in their new 
environment and the education needed to learn these skills;30 as a 
result upward mobility becomes myth to them. Moreover,  the number 
of persons crowding into urban areas has exceeded the needs of in-
dustry, commerce, and the service trades. As a result government 
is faced with unprecedented demands ,  far from being met, for more 
services of all types . Thus for the majority of migrants ,  the city 
brings objective living conditions often worse than those endured 
in the countryside. Frustrated and disillusioned , the migrants are 
· readily persuaded to political violence or extremism. 31 
2 .  Migrants experience major social and psychological problems 
in adjusting to the urban environment . Most of the newcomers have 
been torn from tightly structured rural society and plunged into a 
29Paul Keoso , "A Developing Democracy ," in Russel C. Ewing ( ed . ) , 
Six Faces of Mexico (Tucson, Ariz . :  University of Arizona Press, 1966) , 
p .  164 . 
3°For example , see Gino Germani , "Inquiry into the Social Effects 
of Urbanization in a Working-class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in 
Philip M.  Hauser (ed . ) ,  Urbanization in Latin America, (New York: 
Colombia University Press , 1961) , 223-224 . 
31K .  F .  Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political 
Instability , "  op. cit . ,  439.  
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bewildering , impersonal , and harsh environment with few or no 
sources of support and guidance. Shock and general social dis-
32 organization produce personal disorientation and political 
anomie. This in turn often leads to an undermini�g of orthodox 
religious values and the final result is an "anomic gap" , a time 
lag between the loss of the traditional value system and the 
acceptance of a replacement system. 33 During this period the 
migrant is particularly vulnerable to recruitment into extremist 
political movements which seek to satisfy his psychological need 
for reintegration. 
3 .  Urbanization creates increased awareness of government and 
politics which in turn leads to mobilization of radical opposition 
force. Proponents of this theory say that exposure to the urban en-
vironment with its higher level of social communication and salience 
of organized political activity accelerates the politicization of 
migrants and creates conditions for mass involvement in direct politi­
cal action. 34 Migrant frustrations and anxieties , outlined above,  
stemming from problems of assimilation into the urban environment are 
translated into support for and recruitment into extremist groups seek-
32Martin C .  Needler , Latin American Politics in Perspective 
(Princeton, N.J . : Van Nostrand , 1963) , 63-64 . 
33G .  Soares and R .  L .  Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and 
Voting for the Radical Lef t :  Chile, 1952," The American Political 
Science Review , 61 (December , 1967) , 1054 . 
34K .  F .  Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political 
Instability ," op. cit . ,  441. 
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35 ing participants for a riot. Thus it may be expected that the anti-
system, protest vote in a given region will increase in response to 
high urbanization rate s . 36 The increasingly politicized urban masses, 
with a high potential for radical agitation, pose a real threat to 
orderly development within the Latin American political system. 37 
The Migrant Radical : Evidence 
There does not appear to be a great deal of evidence to substan-
tiate these interrelated migrant theories; however ,  a few analysts 
have collected data which merit consideration. Bryan Roberts, while 
conducting a study in a poor neighborhood in Guatemala City found that 
public political activists (that is those who participate in demon-
strations , etc . )  appear to include a higher percentage of migrants .  
That i s ,  72 percent of the family heads in the neighborhood studied 
are migrants while 90 percent of the activists are migrants .  In 
addition he found that among the migrants in the neighborhood, the 
group that is most active in public political behavior is the residents 
35Kenneth F .  Johnson, Urbanization and Political Change in Latin 
America (Ph . D .  dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 
1963; Ann Arbor, Mich . :  University Microfilms , 1964, No. 64-2244) , 
pp . 137-138; and Dankwart A.  Rustow, A World of Nations : Problems of 
Political Modernization (Washington D .C . :  The Brookings Institution, 
1967), 245 .  
36soares and Hamblin, op.  cit . ,  1062. 
37Rex D. Hopper, "Research on Latin American Sociology , "  in 
Charles Wagley (ed . ) ,  Social Science Research on Latin America, (New 
York: Columbia University Press , 1964) , 264; also see Samuel P .  
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press ,  1968) , 281-283 ; and John W. Dyckman, "Some Condi­
tions of Civic Order in an Urbanized World", Daedalus, (Summer, 1966), 
798-799. 
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38 who .have been in the city less than ten years.  However, Roberts 
also points out that this same group is least politically active 
privately (His selected index of private political behavior is. 






Voting and Migrant Status of Husbands and Wives 
in Two Guatemala City Neighborhoods 
(Percentages) 
. 
Years of Residence in Guatemala City 
One or both Both 20 Both at One or Both 
since birth or more least 10-20 less than 10 
42 42 40 26 
58 58 60 74 
At best Roberts' evidence is inconclusive.  The migrants appear 
to be politically active publicly, but not privately . Also the in-
dices he has selected are directed at determining general political 
behavior patterns and thus yield little information concerning the 
migrants propensity for political radicalism. Indices for public 
38Bryan Roberts ,  "Urban Poverty and Political Behavior in 
Guatemala , "  Human Organization (Spring , 1970) , 25. 
39Ibid. , 24.  
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political behavior include participation in local betterment commit-
tees (hardly an indicator of radical political behavior) as well as 
participation in demonstrations . On the other hand, the fact that 
74 percent of the new migrants do not vote at all might lead one to 
conclude that this group is not likely to engage in private radical 
political action or any other kind of private political action for 
that matter. Clearly if Roberts' evidence is the best.available, 
then it may be concluded that the migrant theories are not well sub-
stantiated . 
Problems With the Migrant Radicalization Theories 
Data which can explain where the migrant theory goes wrong are 
40 more plentiful than ev�dence on the migrant behavior itself . The 
assumption that migrants tend to be politically disruptive rests on 
the image of such migrants as uprooted , isolated , and deprived , hence 
anomic, frustrated, and prone to express frustration through politi-
cal channels. Each aspect of this image may be separately examined. 
First although migrants are by definition uprooted, they are 
usually better prepared for city life than is commonly assumed. Al-
though the proportions vary greatly from country to country and among 
maj or cities within each country, it may still be generally said that 
much migration into the great urban areas in Latin America comes from 
smaller cities, and towns rather than from open country. 
40For example, see Joan M.  Nelson, "The Urban Poor : Disruption 
or Political Integration in Third World Cities," World Politics, No . 3 
(April , 1970) , 397-399. 
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For example, in Santiago, Chile , two-thirds of a sample of 
economically active migrants were born in towns of 10, 000 or over. 
41 Only a seventh had been born in places of less than 1 , 000. Also 
among migrants to six Brazilian cities (excluding immigrants from 
abroad) , 23 percent came from other large cities , 56 percent said 
their place of origin was a small city or town , and 21 percent were 
from clearly rural places .42 In Peru the migration trend is generally 
from the rural mountain areas to-relatively important towns in the 
large valleys of the Andes , and from there perhaps on to Lima. 43 Gino 
Germani, in analyzing a small urban area on the outskirts of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina , found that only about 15% of the migrants to this 
urban district (Isla Maciel) had lived in areas having a population 
of less than 2�000. In addition more than one-third of the migrants 
had been born in medium-sized towns of 2 , 000 to 20 , 000 inhabitants, 
and 50 percent in large towns . 44 More evidence along this same. line 
might be presented, but the preceding seems representative enough to 
indicate a general trend . 
Those migrants who do jump directly from farm to metropolitan 
center tend to come from not too distant villages . A case in point is 
the largely migrant working class barrio (El Carmen) in Bogota, 
4 1Herrick, op. cit . ,  53 , 103. 
42The secondary source here is Joan M. Nelson, Occasional Paper 
No. 22,  op. cit . ,  11,  and she cites from Bertram Hutchinson, "The 
Migrant Population of Urban Brazil ," America Latina , 6 : 2  (1963) , 43-44. 
43J .  Matos Mar , "The ' barriados' of Lima : an example of integration 
into urban life," in Philip M .  Hauser (ed . ) , Urbanization in Latin 
America, (New York: International Documents Service , 1961) , 173 .  
44G .  Germani , "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in 
a Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in Hauser , op. c it . ,  
212. 
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Colombia where 60 percent of the migrants were from rural areas . 
Here approximately 67 percent of the in-migrants traveled 100 miles 
or less while only 4 percent were born '.")0 miles or more from 
Bogota .  
Table 845 
Distance Traveled by In-Migrants to Barrio El 
Carmen, Bogota , Colombia 
Miles Frequency Percentage 
0-50 31 2 9 . 3  
51-100 41 38 . 7  
101-150 17 16.0  
151-200 12 11.3  
201-250 2 1 . 9  
250 o r  more 3 2 . 8  
TOTAL 106 100.0 
Also , according to Flinn, six other barrios studied in Bogota 
by the City Planning Off ice further emphasized that most moves cover 
short distances. 
What is important is that villages and towns not too far from 
maj or metropolitan centers are likely to be heavily exposed to mass 
media, government activity , urban consumer goods,  and other urban influ-
ences .  Moreover ,  those who move to the city from nearby villages are 
likely to maintain ties with friends and relatives left behind , and 
45William L .  Flinn, Rural to Urban Migration: A Colombian Case, 
Research Publication No . 19 (University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center 
July 1966) , 23.  
to return for visits on fa�ily occasions. and holidays , thereby both 
reinforce their own rural ties and introducing urban influences to 
the village. 
Another difficult adjustment problem the migrant has is said to 
come from the high degree of social isolation he suffers. This too 
may be exaggerated in that it appears that the great maj ority of 
migrants do have some contacts in the city when they arrive.  Among 
the migrants to two adjacent working class neighborhoods , that Gino 
Germani surveyed in Buenos Aires , 81 percent found friends or rela-
tives or both upon arrival , and 60 percent received assistance in 
46 finding housing, work, or lllOney to tide them over the first days . 
A survey of migrants in Santiago, Chile, found that 83 percent had 
friends or family in the city or received.assistance in settling. 47 
Ninety-two percent of the migrants in a Bogota squatter settlement 
had contacts on arriva1 . 48 Andrew Pearse, in a study of urbanization 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, also found evidence similar to the pre­
ceding . 49 
There are other socio-psychological variables, also , which some 
"urban-instability" theorists propose as factors affecting migrant 
political attitudes. Many concentrate on the deterioration of nuclear 
family and extended family bonds as one inescapable consequence of 
46 Germani in Hauser, op.  cit . ,  213-214 . 
47 Herrick, op. cit . ,  91.  
48 Flinn, op . cit . ,  27.  
49see Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the 
City of Rio de Janeiro ,"  in Hauser , op. cit., 199 . 
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integration into the urban industrial culture . As early as 1952, how-
ever, Oscar Lewis presented evidence that, at least in the case of 
Mexico, strong family and kinship ties were wholly compatible with 
urban life and industrialization. 50 Lewis ' subsequent work in this 
area,  based on a much wider sample of migrant families, served to 
corroborate these early observations and showed that migrant family 
life in Mexico City remained quite stable,  and that extended family 
ties increased rather than d.ecreased. 
Despite previous urban exposure , friends and relatives, and 
continued family ties, some of the newcomers undoubtedly do feel more 
or less uprooted and isolated.  Howeve r >  the point is  that the picture 
of their plight should not be overdrawn. Evidence which is presently 
available to this writer suggests that the maj ority of new urban 
dwellers do not experience great problems in socio-psychological 
adjustment to their new environment . Thus , it does not appear that 
the socio-psychological factor is particularly important in producing 
political radicalization among the migrants. 
Primary to the migrant theories is the assumption that the mi-
grants are disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions in the 
city. Again the evidence regarding the present situation does not 
bear out this assumption. Survey findings are almost unanimous on 
the point that most migrants consider themselves better off , and 
probably are in fact better off , than they were before they moved . 
50oscar Lewis,  "Urbanization Without Breakdown : A Case Study , "  in 
Dwight B .  Heath and Richard N .  Adams > (eds . ) ,  Contemporary Cultures and 
Societies of Latin America , (New York: Random House , 1965), 424-437. 
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Looking first at employment , most migrants seem to find jobs 
fairly quickly. (See Table 9) . The high proportions finding work 
so soon suggest that many migrants have jobs lined up before they 
arrive . 
Table 951 
Time Required for Migrants to Find First Job in City 
City Sample 
Santiago , 310 economically active 
Chile migrants arriving in 
Santiago within previous 
decade . Roughly 40 per-
cent white collar. 
Buenos Aires 446 residents of a 
"villa miseria" , 
mostly recent migrant s ,  
61 percent day laborers 
or unskilled workers. 
Brazil : six cities 5250 adults,  including 
(includes Rio and 3035 migrants of whom 
Sao Paulo) 1483 sought j obs on 
arrival . 
Percent Finding 
Work Within : 
40 percent 2 days 
63 1 month 
80 6 months 
74 percent 2 weeks 
85 1 month 
80 percent 1 month 
95 (male) 4 months 
90 (female) 4 months 
Surveys consistently show lower rates of open unemployment among 
migrants than among native urbanites .  This is true for city-wide or 
more limited surveys in Bogota and Santiago (See Table 10) . Germani , 
51Reproduced from Nelson , Occasional Paper No.  22,  op . cit . ,  15 . 
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Chile: Unemployment as a Percentage 
of the Labor Force 
Outside Santiago 
1960 
7 . 1% 







7 . 2% 4 . 6% 
4 . 9% 3 .1% 
conclusions. In his survey 5 percent of the males above the age of 
14 in his city-born group were found to be unemployed; in the other two 
groups (one composed of marginal migrants and one of recent migrants) 
the figure was 2 or 3 percen� . Twenty-one percent of the women in the 
recent migrant group were gainfully employed , while the proportion was 
lower among the native-born women .53 
From the standpoint of the migrant' s own personal satisfaction, 
which is most important in determining the extent of his frustrations, 
it seems less important to determine how his economic situation com-
pares with those of natives than whether he has , or at least believes 
he has, improved his situation by moving . Generally the migrant 
52 Herrick, op . cit . ,  84 . 
53Germani in Hauser, op . cit . ,  220. 
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believes he has improved his situation by moving to the city.54 
Although this evidence is fragmentary, it seems to indicate consistently 
for a number of cities that most migrants who seek employment find it 
r�asonably quickly . Moreover, the great majority find their new work an im-
provement over their positions before moving , in terms of working conditions 
and , less uniformly, status and earnings. Thus while there obviously is some 
frustration among some migrants to Latin America ' s  cities, the amount is 
apparently a great deal less than the "economic frustration" theorists would 
have us believe. 
Among those few migrants who are both disappointed and bitter, there 
is little reason to expect them to express their frustration politically. 
Instead the migrants may turn their anger inward in withdrawal and defeat; 
they may beat their wives or quarrel with their neighbors ;  they may seek 
oblivion in alcohol or solace in religion. On this last point , Bryan Roberts , 
in his study of Protestant groups in Guatemala City, describes one Protes-
tant who felt a life-long hostility to the power of the military and land-
owners. According to Roberts the man gave thanks to God that he had become 
a ?rotestant , since, he said , this had made him realize the irrelevance of 
suffering in this world and had prevented him from losing his life in futile 
attacks on the governments -of the day. 55 Thus in many cases Protestant 
54For example , see Henry Dietz , "Urban Squatter Settlements in Peru: A 
Case History and Analysis ," Journal of Inter-American Studies , (July, 1969) , 
359 ; and Germani in Hauser, op. cit . ,  223 . 
55Bryan R. Roberts,  "Protestant Groups and Coping with Urban Life in · 
Guatemala City ," American Journal of Sociology, 73 (May , 1968) , 759. If 
interested in this aspect ,  also see E. Willens,  "Protestantism and . Cultural 
Change in Brazil and Chile , 11 in William D.  Antonio and Frederick Pike (eds . ) , 
Religion, Revolution, and Reform (New York: Frederick A.  Prager , Inc . ,  1964 ) ;  
and Ivan Vallier , "Religious Elites : Differentiations and Developments in 
Roman Catholicism" , in S . M .  Kipset (ed . ) ,  Elites in Latin America (New York: 
Oxford University Press , 1967) , lSJ-223; and June Nash , "Protestantism in the 
Highlands of Western Guatemala" (unpublished manuscript) , cited in Nathan L .  
Whetten, Guatemala: The Land and the People, (New Haven, Conn: Yale University 
Press , 1961) . 
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and Catholic groups in Latin America may withdraw the frustrated 
migrant from overt participation in urban politics. 
In addition to the preceding list of individual reactions , there 
are many associational responses with little or no political relevance. 
The of ten overlooked point is that political actio�� whether individual 
or associational , moderate or extremist,  legal or illegal,  is only one 
class of reactions to frustration among many others .  
Moreover, the more recent a migrant ' s  arrival in the city, the 
less likely he is to translate frustration over economic conditions (or 
any other problem) into political action. Those migrants who come directly 
from rural areas are likely to have little political interest or aware­
ness, 56 and may bring with them ingrained attitudes of fatalism and habits 
of deference to authority which inhibit ideological rebellion against the 
status quo . 57 A t  any rate, it seems quite unlikely that the disappointed 
migrants will vent their frustration through political channels . 58 
The preceding lengthy discussion leads us to conclude that the 
migrants' political behavior is not primarily a reflection of the trauma 
of migration. It seems much more likely to assume that the political 
socialization which the migrant experiences through urban residence is 
56wayne Cornelius, in studying migrants to Mexican metropolitan 
areas notes that an analysis of survey data indicates that a majority of 
these migrants grew up in nearly rural areas and came directly to the 
big city. He also notes these same migrants display very low levels of 
political awareness . Cornelius's evidence concerning this point will 
be presented in the next chapter . 
57For example , see Soares in Horowitz,  op . cit . ,  193-194. 
58 Nelson, Occasional Paper No . 2 2 ,  op.  cit . ,  45 . 
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more important in shaping his pol'itical behavior than are the often 
assumed widespread psychological characteristics of anomie and frustra-
tion. 
Glaucio Soares proposes that the process of migrant radicalization 
is dependent upon the race between urbanization, which heightens the 
level of aspirations for increasing numbers of people, and industriali­
zation, which satisfies them. 59 He cites two extreme cases in Brazil 
where urbanization proceeds at a faster rate than industrialization, 
Recife and Rio de Janeiro.  According to Soares, in 1945 and 1947 the 
Communist Party had its greatest successes in these two cities . 60 
However , his findings do not indicate the percentage of migrants (those 
with ten or less years of residence) in these cities that voted Communist. 
Moreover , most of the evi�ence presented by Soares suggests that among 
the unskilled migrants in Brazil the propensity to engage in radical 
action increases as the period of urbanization lengthens. Thia leads 
one to wonder if perhaps there is not some validity to the radical ·mar-
ginal theory . (This theory relates to migrants with more than ten years 
of urban residence.)  
The Radical Marginals : Theory 
Proponents of this theory state that the "demonstration effect" of 
concentrated buying power and highly conspicious forms of consumption 
in urban areas makes the migrant who still ekes out a marginal existence 
59Glaucio Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in 
Brazil," in Irving L .  Horowitz , (ed . ) ,  Revolution in Brazil (New York: 
E . P .  Dutton and Co . ,  Inc . ,  1964) , 195 . 
60ibid. 
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increasingly conscious of his low status in society. As a result 
cognitive mechanisms of relative deprivation are set into operation. 61 
Essentially there is a discrepancy between the marginal's present ex­
perience and the outcome of anticipated upward mobility . 62 Feelings 
of relative deprivation according to the theory , lead to alienation; 
and as the years go by this alienation increases and begins to find 
expression through radical political activity. 
Recently there has arisen a "second generation theory" which is 
a modified version of the radical marginal theory. For example Talton 
Ray, writing about Venezuelan "barrio" youths in their teens and early 
twenties,  notes : 
"Several factors work against their adopting to their 
barrio status. They have grown up , for the most part, 
in the cities and are not aware of how much less 
satisfactory life in the countryside can be . Their 
education is more advanced than their elders . As 
barrio residents , they have had far more exposure to 
the world of party politics than their parents had 
at the same age. A significant number have already 
had experience in taking political action, and the 
parties that have given them this experience usually 
are not the traditional parties • • • •  Their situation 
will seem worse to them than it was to their parents .  
As a generation they will be more aware of what they 
want and what they do not have. Although they should 
be more qualified for employment , they will still find 
it very difficult to secure • • • •  They will be more 
alert to their political strength and L . .  ! means avail­
able for voicing their demands . 1 163 , 
61G .  Soares, "The Politics of Uneven Development : The Case of 
Brazil," in S . M .  Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed . ) , Party Systems ' and 
Voter Alignments : Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 
1967) , 488-489; and Soares and Hamblin, op. cit . ,  1055-105 6 .  
62Don R. Bowen, et.  al . ,  Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation 
Toward Protest of the Urban Poor", American Behavioral Scientist, 
(March-April, 1968) , 23 . 
63 . Talton Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley, 
1968) , 281-282. 
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To the extent that the radical marginal theory is valid , its 
impl ications are far-reaching . In nearly all of Latin America large 
and growing parts of the urban population have long experience in 
the city, but have not found a secure niche in the urban economic and 
social system. Thus the theory ' s  predictions of turbulence and extre­
mism appear to be highly relevant and disturbing . However, despite 
its obvious importance , this theory unfortunately remains virtually 
untested; and, therefore, its validity remains questionable .  
The Radical Marginals :  Evidence 
Among the bits of evidence that are available concerning this 
theory, there appear to be problems of definition and interpretation. 
The primary problem stems from devising an adequate index of radicalism. 
Even where voting data are available and the party system includes a 
party which is both legal and clearly radical , it may be misleading to 
equate support for this party in any single election with a sustained 
radical orientation. Survey questions which probe for radical senti­
ment are likely to produce evasive replies, hence resort to indices 
which do not alarm respondents ,  but also do not measure radicalism 
very well. 
Glaucio Soares ' survey of class identification and political 
affiliation in Rio de Janeiro, which provides part of the evidence 
for his radical marginal theory, illustrates these problems . The 
survey, conducted in 1960, covered a cross-section of all classes and 
included two hundred sixty-eight skilled and unskilled manual workers. 
From this sample Soares found that "radicalism" measured in terms of 
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support for the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) was highest among un-
skilled -(marginal) laborers wl .,ad long urban experience . His 
data are summarized in the following : 
Table 664 
Radicalism Among Manual Workers , Rio , 1960 
Skill Level Length of Urban Residence 
Less than 20 Years More than 20 Years 
Percent Sample Percent Sample 
for PTB Size for PTB Size 
Skilled workers 38 (92) 37 (72) 
Unskilled workers 32 (62) so (42) 
The data present a couple of problems. First, there is the question 
of interpreting support for the Brazilian Labor Party as evidence of 
radical sentiment. An expressed preference for the PTB certainly indi-
cates interest in social reform, but falls well short of implying desire 
for a radical transformation of the social, economic, and political 
systems . Second , Soares did not test his findings against controls for 
differences in education, ·age , or other variables which might be masked 
by skill level, and which might be partly or largely responsible for 
his result s .  
Joan Nelson' s interpretation of data from the study by Alex Inkeles 
and his associates of the impact of factory experience on workers ' 
attitudes lends somewhat greater support to the radicalization theory. 
For this study, surveys were conducted among large samples of factory 
64soares in Horowitz , op.  cit . ,  192. 
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workers and smaller control groups of urban non-industrial workers 
and of cultivators in six developing nations . The Inkeles surveys 
did not inquire into party preferences .  However, in Argentina res-
pondents were asked what kind of social and economic change was 
desirable in their country - rapid and drastic change , moderate 
change , no change , or a return to the earlier days. Miss Nelson 
constructed a three-point scale from replies on two such questions . 
Table 7 shows the pattern which emerges if respondents are grouped 
by skill and occupation, and by degree of urban experience . Mean 
scores on the radicalism scale are compared across these group s .  
Table 765 
Radicalism and Urban Experience in Argentina (Mean scores on 
"radicalism scale" : high figure indicates more "radical" : 
Possible range 1-3) . 
Skill/Occupations Sample Years Urban Since Age 15 
Size 
0-4 5-11 12 or Urban-
more born 
Unskilled factory workers 58 1 . 17 1. 75 1. 75 2 . 09 
Semi-skilled factory 421 1 . 35 1 .65 1 . 92 1 . 98 
workers 
Skilled factory workers 110 a 1 . 86 1 . 56 2 . 13 
Low-level non-factory 24 a a 2 . 4 0  
workers 
Higher-level non-factory 23 a a 2 . 35 
workers 
Avg. 
1 . 88 
1 . 84 
2 . 07 
2 . 33 
2 . 39 
a/Mean scores based on 1 or 2 respondents have been omitted from table . 
Examining only the three migrant categories, unskilled and semi-skilled 
65Joan M .  Nelson, "Migrants ,  Urban Poverty , and Instability in 
Developing Nations , Harvard Center for International Affairs ,  Occasional 
Paper No.  22 (Cambridge , Mass. 1969) , 40.  
40 
migrant factory workers seem to become more "radical" with longer 
urban experience, while skilled workers become less disposed to 
radical change as they gain urban experience. However , there is at 
least one significant weakness with this data also. The questions 
comprising the scale measure receptivity to rapid social change and 
the recognition of need for such change, but they leave open the 
political means of bringing about such change. 
Problems with the Radical Marginal Theory 
The primary problem lies not with the broad outlines of the 
marginal theory, but with its failure to consider rates and leakages.  
If  expectations rise more slowly than aspirations , and if small improve­
ments are felt as real progress, or if the society is viewed as essen­
tially open despite individual disappointments ,  then frustration may 
grow more slowly than the theorists assume . If political awareness 
spreads gradually ,  discontinuously, and unevenly among the urban poor; 
if the connection between political awareness and political action is 
less automatic and more influenced by the political and social setting 
than the theory implies; and if the urban poor are less disposed to 
blame the government for their troubles than are the more privileged , 
then the likelihood that frustration will be channeled into political 
protest is reduced regardless of the level of frustration. A great 
deal of discontent will leak out of the political system into other, 
apolitical responses. 
One of the basic premises of the marginal theory is that , as the 
years go by, the marginals '  aspirations for material well-being will 
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continue to rise at a higher rate than their ability to satisfy them. 
Housing can certainly be considered a major component of material well-
being . In Argentina, urban workers were shown photographs of several 
different grades of housing . They were asked both to identify the 
picture most like their current house , and to indicate the kind of 
house they would like in order to really be satisfied. By numbering 
each grade of housing , from poorest to best, the "housing aspiration 
gap" between an individual ' s  desired and current housing can be calcu-
lated . (See Table 11) . Looking at all migrants as a group , the 
housing aspiration gap narrows steadily with longer urban residence. 
Table 1166 
Urban Experience and Housing Satisfaction 
Country Index Years Urban Since Age 15 
Argentina 0-4 5-11 12 or more 
Mean score on "gap" scale 3 . 17 2 . 72 2 . 25 
{Possible range 1-7 : high 
score indicates dissatis-
faction 
Percent satisfied with 14 34 43 
current housing (no gap) 
Some of the other indices used to measure the aspiration gap do 
correlate positively, indicating that a gap does exist ; howeve r ,  in· 
66Joan M .  Nelson, uMigrants ,  Urban Poverty , and Instability in 
Developing Nations , Harvard Center for International Affairs ,  Occasional 
Paper No . 22 (Cambridge , Mass. 1969) , 4 0 .  
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almost all cases, the evidence shows that the gap does not widen 
particularly rapidly. For example one survey shows that in Argentina 
and Chile , as urban experience increases, workers in all categories 
except the semi-skilled become less content with their jobs, in roughly 
the same degree. 67 
Table 1268 
Skill Level ,  Urban Experience , and Job Satisfaction 
(Mean Score on Job Satisfaction: High 
Score Indicates Satisfaction 
Possible Range (1-4) 
Country and skill/occupation Sample Size Years Urban Since Age 15 
0-4 5-11 12 or more 
Argentina 
Unskilled factory worker (58) 3 . 67 2.81 2 . 75 
Semi-skilled factory worker (417) 3 . 4 2  3 . 23 3 . 38 
Skilled factory worker (109) 4 . 00 3 . 33 3 . 11 
0-2 3-10 11 or more 
Chile 
Unskilled factory worker (163) 3 . 00 2 .80 2 . 68 
Semi-skilled factory worker (228) 2 . 64 2 . 91 2 .89 
Skilled factory worker (292) 3 . 44 3 . 07 3 . 04 
Low-level non-factory worker (55) 4 . 00 2 . 46 3 . 00 
High-level non-factory worker (45) 3 . 60 3 . 00 
Actual accomplishments and the value the poor themselves place on 
these accomplishments are also crucial in determining the size of the 
total gap between aspirations and achievement and the resultant degree 
67Joan M.  Nelson , ''Migrants ,  Urban Poverty , and Instability in 
Developing Nations , Harvard Center for International Affairs ,  Occasional 
Paper No . 22 (Cambridge , Mass. 1969) , 46-47 . 
68 Ibid . , 4 7 .  
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of frustration. A sense of achievement may reflec t ,  for example, 
a better j ob .  In this respect ,  the radicalization theory tacitly 
assumes substantial occupational immobility at the lowest levels of 
urban society . This can be tested with data on occupational mobility 
between generations . Among men whose fathers were unskilled or semi-
skilled manual workers ,  what proportion are themselves at these lowest 
steps on th' occupational ladder? Table 13 shows the occupational 
Table 1369 
Occupational Mobility of Men Whose Fathers Were Unskilled 
(Fathers are Marginals) 
Sao Paulo,  Brazil 
Occupational level of sons 
1 .  Unskilled manual domestic, 
vendors .  
2 .  Semi-skilled and skilled manual 
workers ,  including supervisory 
manual grades . 
3 .  Lower-level non-manual, includ­
ing supervisors , shop and office 
clerks . 
4 .  Higher-level non-manual and 
owners of medium-small busi­
nesses. 
5 .  Administrative and executive 
posts; owners of medium-large 
stores and factories. 




31 . 2  
42 . 0  
1 2 . 1  
8 . 6  
3.0 





21 . 1  
5 2 . 6  
21.1  
2 . 3  
2 .9 
o . o  
69Joan M .  Nelson , "Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in 
Developing Nations , Harvard Center for International Affair s ,  Occasional 
Paper No. 22 (Cambridge, Mass .  1969 ) ,  54.  
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levels reached by men whose fathers were unskilled, in large samples 
drawn in Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires. The table clearly shows that in 
both cities a maj ority of those born into the bottom strata rose out 
of them. Most became skilled manual workers , but substantial fractions 
found their way into lower - or higher - level non-manual j ob s ,  and a 
few broad-jumped into higher administrative, business, or professional 
positions . 
In addition the preceding study may understate the extent of 
upward mobility for urban lower-class groups . Broad occupational cate­
gories conceal a substantial range within each category in job prestige , 
security, pay, and working conditions. Many men who ,  like their 
fathers, hold unskilled jobs may nevertheless have made some progress 
in their own and others ' judgment • .  
These fragmentary observations on progress within and movement out 
of the lowest economic strata do not suggest a rosy picture . They do , 
however, indicate that modest occupational mobility is fairly widespread. 
In summation it may be said that neither the aspiration nor the achieve­
ment gap is nearly as wide as most frustration theorists imply ; and, 
therefore, the total aspiration-achievement gap is much narrower than 
often assumed . Consequently the extent of frustration, particularly 
that vented through political channels, is not as great as might be 
expected. 
In fact , resort to political modes of expression and action is 
less likely among the poor and ill-educated (for example , among the 
marginals) than among more advantaged groups . Survey research at all 
levels is most consistent in pointing to the relationship between level 
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of education and degree of interest , sense of efficacy, and extent 
70 of actual participation in political and public affairs. More 
evidence relating to this preceding statement will be presented in 
the next chapter. 
One might conclude then that the marginal radicalization theory, 
in contrast to the myth of the disruptive migrants ,  is probably over-
stated rather than wrong . This much cannot be said for the migrant 
theorie s .  If there remains any doubt concerning this point, more 
evidence may be gathered to substantiate it by simply focusing on the 
city itself as the unit of analysis. For example, in Barrio El Carmen 
on the edge of Bogota, a squatter settlement improved to the point 
where three-fourths of the houses were one- or two-story brick with 
sheet metal roofs; "the overwhelming maj ority • • • •  stated that their 
housing , sanitation facilitie s ,  income , medical service , and educational 
opportunities for the children were better in the barrio than in their 
previous countryside residences. Few expressed any desire to return 
71 to their area of origin." Obviously, for the recent migrant , whose 
only basis of comparison is his area of origin, the city, at least 
initially , will appear relatively attractive to him. 
Finally it should be noted that a basic assumption for political 
radicalization and resulting instability is a high incidence of group 
violence . In this respect,  even though the unit of analysis is too 
7°For example, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba , The Civic 
Culture , 8 7 ,  94 , 121 , 152 . 
71 Flinn, op . cit . ,  37 . 
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large to draw any specific conclusions, the following evidence 
concerning group violence calculated at a national level merits 
presentation. 
Table 1472 
The Rural-urban Dichotomy and 
Group Violence 
Country Number of Deaths Rank Percent of Percent of 
from group Vio- Population Population 
lence 1950-1962 in Farming in Cities 
Over 
20,000 
Bolivia 663 4 72  19.4  
Colombia 316 6 55 22.4 
Argentina 217 8 25 48.5  
Honduras 111 10 .5  66 11.5  
Panama 25 21 54 33.1  
With the exception of  Argentina , the above table indicates a 
significant correlation between deaths from mass violence and numbers 
of people engaged in farming activities. Such highly urbanized nations 
as Uruguay, Brazil , and Mexico have not had a significant enough num­
ber of deaths due to group violence to be listed in the table. 73 Ob-
viously other variables, such as the nature of the national political 
72Horowitz in Beyer , op . cit . ,  241. 
73Ibid . ,  242. 
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system, are important in determining the amount of group violenc e ,  
and it is thus impossibl e to generalize from this evidence .  However, 
it does raise some serious questions about the validity of theories , 
such as those which have been discussed , which propose that the 
urban complex is a center for political radicalism. 
In this chapter , the emphasis has been primarily on economic 
and socio-psychological factors and their bearing on the political 
radicalization process. The case studies which will be presented in 
the following two chapters will focus on factors such as political 
awareness and behavior which have not, thus far, been well examined . 
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the primary index for political 
behavior will be voting . (The shortcomings of the voting index as a 
predictor of radicalism hav� already been pointed out.l However, 
because of the lack of reliable data, this writer is presently unable 
to construct a better index to measure politically disruptive be­
havior .  
Chapter III . 
The Politics of Mexico ' s  
New Urban Masses 
While studying the Mexican rural-urban migrant and his attitudes 
and behavior with respect to politically disruptive activity, the 
emphasis will be placed on political, rather than economic, social 
or psychological factors which influence radical tendencies. Al­
though the migrants '  problems regarding economic assimilation and 
socio-psychological adjustment will be briefly treated , the focus 
will be on measuring migrant political alienation which often leads 
to resulting political radicalization. In pursuit of this objective, 
it will be necessary to examine the Mexican political party process 
(since opposition party preference and voting will serve as two of 
the primary indices to measure political radicalism) and its impact 
on the urban environmen t .  First , in order to provide the proper 
setting for our discussion, it might be helpful to briefly examine 
recent urbanization trends in Mexico . 
Since 1900, Mexican urban communities have grown at a faster 
rate than has the entire country. Between 1940 and 1950, urban areas 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants showed a growth rate of 73 per­
cent as compared with approximately 31 percent for the country as a 
whole .  In 1921, 68.8 percent of the population lived in communities 
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of fewer than 2 , 500 persons. In 1930, this was reduced to 6 6 . 5% to 
57% in 1950, and estimates in 1960 indicate that almost one-half of 
Mexico ' s  population is urban. 74 It is further estimated that by 1980 
nearly 70% will be urbanites. 75 Mexico ' s  high rate of natural popu-
lation growth (about 3 . 8% per annum in 1967 and 1968) has, of course, 
been an important factor in urban expansion. Of far greater impor-
tance, however, is the movement of population from the countryside 
into the cities, which reached torrential proportions in the 1950-
1960 period, when over 2 . 4  million persons participated in the exodus 
from rural life. 
Population pressure on the rural , exhausted, arable land has been 
a basic cause of the mass rural-to-urban migration in Mexico . This is 
reinforced by the lure of economic opportunity in the cities. An 
institutional cause of this migration relates to agrarian reform and 
the program of ejidos or collective farms . Reform is designed to 
break up great land holdings through systematic donation of lands to 
peasant farmers .  Apparently the extensive reform bureaucracy has been 
in league to some extent with corrupt local politicians who are fleecing 
peasants of their harvest profits. As a result many of the disillusioned 
76 peasants are moving to the city to escape this exploitation . 
With respect to rural-to-urban migration patterns in Mexic o ,  most 
74K.F.  Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change, op.  cit . ,  83.  
75wayne A. Cornelius, Jr . ,  "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin 
American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico , "  The American Poli­
tical Science Review , No. 3 ,  (September , 1969) , 838. 
76Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change," op . cit . , 86.  
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inter-state migration has originated in the six centrally-located 
states comprising the Mexican Baj io , a semi-arid agricultural region 
where population pressure on the land has been most severe.  Long­
distance migration has been concentrated overwhelmingly in a few large 
streams running from the centrally-located states to the Mexico City 
(Federal District) metropolitan area and the North Pacific (Baja 
California) region. During the 1950-1960 period the population of 
the Federal District grew to over five million inhabitants ,  and grow­
ing at an annual rate of 7 . 2  percent , its population is expected to 
top the seven million mark by 1970. The impact of migration on the 
capital ' s  expansion can be gauged from the fact that over 37 percent 
of the people in the District in 1960 had migrated from elsewhere in 
the nation since 1950. 
The Mexican Migrant ' s  Adjustment to Urban Living 
The case of Mexico provides additional evidence concerning the 
economic and social frustration theories which propose that the new 
urban dweller has to face serious adjustment problems . 
From the economic standpoint , there is some evidence that material 
deprivation in Mexican urban areas is not as serious as might be 
expected given the massive influx of new residents from the country­
sice. Harley L .  Browning , working with a sample of the 1960 Mexican 
census of the Federal District, found that contrary to expectations , 
migrants ,  those born outside the Federal District, do not differ 
greatly in most respects from the native population in socioeconomic 
characteristics. He concludes that when standard of living indicators 
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are taken from the census data (availability of running water in 
households, sewage facilities, separate bathrooms, ownership of 
radio and TV) there is virtually no difference between the migrants 
and the natives.77 Respondents in Joseph Kahl ' s  Measurement of 
Modernism survey were asked to comment on the adequacy of social 
welfare services available to them in the Federal District. As 
the following .data indicate, migrant evaluations were significantly 
more positive than those metropolitans (the latter defined as those 
respondents living in Mexico City who had been living in large - cities 












The conclusion then is that widespread service deprivation and 
deteriorating overall conditions of life for the in-migrant popula-
tion are more often assumed than demonstrated . 
It is reasonable to assume that successful economic assimilation 
depends in large part upon the migrant ' s  capacity to display salable 
productive skills.  This in turn depends on his premigration pre-
paration: his education and work experience .  Among the newly-
77Harley L .  Browning , "Urbanization and Modernization in Latin 
America: The Demographic Perspective ," in Beyer , op . cit . ,  90-91. · 
78 The secondary source here is Cornelius , op . cit . ,  839 ,  and 
he cites from Joseph A.  Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism: A 
Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico (Austin, Texas,  University of 
Texas Pres s ,  1968) . 
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79 arrived migrants in Cornelius ' s  Civic Culture sample (those with 
under two years of urban residence) , 70% had attained some level of 
primary education (up to six years of schooling) , and among the 
migrants as a whole ,  69% had achieved a primary education or higher. 80 
It would thus appear that the bulk of migrants arriving in Mexican 
urban centers possess at least the basic educational equipment which 
would enable them to learn productive skills in the post-migration 
period . 
If we do not perceive an objective economic basis for the "frus-
tration gap " ,  which is often hypothesized as characteristic of the 
situation of the migrant , there is still a need to examine his sub-
j ective evaluation of that situation. The data in Table 15 show 
Table 1581 Expectations of Future Economic 
Improvement among Migrants and Urban-Born 
Migrants by Length of Urban 
Residence (in years) .  All 
Migrants 
Expectation 0-2 2-4 5-9 10-19 20 or 
more 
Improve 57% 54% 65% 58% 54% 57% 
Stay the Same 27 25 18 15 12  17 
Get Worse 11 6 8 14 14 . 12 







79cornelius isolated a migrant sample consisting of 467 adult respon­
dents born in rural villages or localities of less than 5 , 000 population 
who had migrated to urban centers of 60,000 or over from the 1297 Mexican 
cases analyzed in The Civic Culture . For a complete description of the 
Mexican sample see Gabriel A .  Almond and Disney Verba, The Civic Culture, 
(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963) , 514-516. 
80 Cornelius, op . cit . ,  839 . 
81Ibid . ,  843. 
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a positive expectation of achieving family economic improvement among 
57% of the cases in Cornelius ' s  Civic Culture migrant sample. 
Certainly there is little here to support the notion of widespread 
and deep frustration of expectations among migrants in Mexico. 
Other adjustment problems the migrants ' are reported to have are 
of a socio-psychological nature. The deterioration of the nuclear 
family is of ten postulated as an inescapable consequence of integration 
into the urban environment . However, as was observed in the previous 
chapter, there is evidence that in Mexico strong family ties are wholly 
compatible with city life. 82 
A potentially more important factor in determining socio-psychological 
adjustment is that of anomie : the lack of stable cognitive orientations 
to a changed situation. Cornelius presents evidence which shows that 
the migrants in his sample tend to be only slightly more anomic than 
the urban born.83 In fact the differences are not even statistically 
significant . Furthermore, the contention that "migration may produce 
anomie, but only in the long run , "  since it may take considerable time 
for migrants to lose traditional norms and values carried over from 
rural life, is not confirmed by Cornelius ' s  evidence either . In fact , 
the data indicate that participation in religious observances, social 
trust , and sense of social cohesion tend to increase among migrants 
84 with longer residence in the city. 
82 see page 30 of this paper . 
83cornelius, op . cit . ,  844. 
84Ibid. 
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In conclusion, it may be said that the case study of Mexico pre-
sents further evidence supportive of this writer ' s  hypotheses I and II. 
That is , there is much less economic frustration and there are far 
fewer socio-psychological adjustment problems among the new urban 
dwellers than some "urban-instability" theorists would have us believe. 
The New Urbanite and Politics 
There are, of course , some general problems involved in studying 
85 p<iliticization and political alienation in Latin America; however, 
the case of Mexico offers some really unique obstacles. For example, 
any attempt to utilize Mexican electoral data for the study of politi-
cal alienation is at once frustrated by the peculiar character of the 
country ' s  political system--its virtual "one-party" structure which 
86 denies opposition groups recognition in honest elections . For this 
reason it is necessary to redefine political alienation specifically 
for the Mexican case. 
In Mexico , political alienation will be understood to mean a 
specific and identifiable syndrome of ideology and behavior which is 
manifest in support for, sympathy toward, or participation in political 
extremism. This , in turn, is defined as advocacy of violence ,  advocacy 
of a conspiratorial interpretation of Mexican political life ( including 
the doctrine that the political system is manipulated by hostile foreign 
85For example, see Daniel Goldrich, "Toward the Comparative Study 
of Politicization in Latin America , "  in Heath and Adams , op. cit . ,  361-378. 
86For a general discussion of this point see Philip B .  Taylor Jr . ,  
"The Mexican elections of 1958 : Affirmation of Authoritarianism?" 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13 , (September, 1960) , 722-744; and 
Keith Botsford, ''Mexico ' s  'Parti Unique ' , " The New Leader , (October 2 8 ,  
1963) , 13-16. 
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powers or by a treasonable internal cabal) ,  advocacy of the relegation 
of the Mexican government or its maj or subdivisions to private enter-
prise or to the Roman Catholic Church, or advocacy of the total abandon­
ment of constitutional government. 87 Obviously this definition is 
constructed to fit right-wing political alienation specifically ; how-
ever , it could easily be modified to indicate left-wing alienation 
88 also. With this understanding it is possible to proceed with a 
discussion of Mexican politics from the urban perspective , and then 
hopefully relate this specifically to the new urban dweller by focusing 
on his political attitudes and behavior. 
Mexican politics: an overview . Since 1929 , governmental offices 
in Mexico have been dominated by the Partido Revolucionario Institutional 
89 (PRI) , and its predecessors .  It has only one serious rival , the 
Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) . This semi-conservative rival party 
often competes for congressional and local offices and the Presidency, 
but has had few victories. 90 Its unofficial, but allegedly real, link-
ages with the disenfranchised Roman Church and with the Mexican upper-
class have made the PAN unacceptable to many proletarian groups who pay 
87K. F .  Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political 
Alienation in Mexico , "  The American Political Science Review , (September, 
1965) , 657 . 
88This does not seem to be necessary in that left-wing alienation is 
not really politically relevant in Mexico.  A defense of this statement 
will be presented in a later part of the discussion. 
89 Robert E .  Scott , Mexican Government in Transition, (Urbana : 
University of Illinois Press , 1964) , 115-144.  
90L .  Vincent Padgett , The Mexican Political System, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company , 1966) , 6 6 .  
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91 homage to the popular reform program of the Revolutionary party. 
The PRI has been able to maintain mass support for its candidates through 
the organizations of its labor , agrarian, and popular sectors . 92 
Historically , Mexican political tradition has not embraced the 
ideal of a loyal opposition in the usual Anglo-American meaning. This 
point was dramatically illustrated by the uncertainty as to whether 
elected panistas would take their seats in the national Camara de 
Diputados after the 1958 elections . Ultimately and with dif f i-
culty, elected opposition candidates from Ensenada , Distrito Federal, 
Michoaccan, San Luis Potosi ,  Chihuahua , and Colima did take their 
seats. 
According to Kenneth Johnson the growing strength of opposition 
party politics in Mexico is directly tied to . urbanization. Johnson 
noted that interviews with leaders of the PAN during the summer of 1962 
indicated that urbanization favors Mexican opposition parties because 
of increased access to individuals and groups which results from urban 
clustering. 93 The importance of urbanization in this respect is that 
it permits and encourages transmission of political values to persons 
who formerly were untouched by political propaganda. 
Mexico ' s  principal opposition party. Accion Nacional was born as 
a political party in September, 193 9 ,  at a national convention held in 
91Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change," op . cit . ,  98 . ·  
9�artin Needler , "The Political Development of Mexico,  The 
American Political Science Association, (June, 1961) , 309 . 
93Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change,"  op. cit . ,  9 9 .  
57 
Mexico City. Its original principles , couched in ethereal language, 
vaguely extolled the inherent dignity of the human person , the state, 
order, liberty , education, the right to labo r ,  private initiative and 
property , the urgency of economic and agrarian reform, the the need to 
restore municipal government t .  ; its classic role in order to insure 
free political participation and human right s .  Recently , PAN has begun 
to focus its appeal in urban areas because of their greater receptivity 
potential. 
Citing figures to the effect that 50 percent of the dwellings in 
the Distrito Federal can be classified , at best, as slums , PAN's plat-
form indicts the Federal Government for its failure to provide decent 
housing and for the general slowness of its social welfare program 
throughout the country .94 
Also, PAN calls for the reform of Articles 3 and 130 of the Con­
stitution to give the Church more participation in education. 95 The 
platform is careful not to mention the church directly but refers in 
general to impediments to man ' s  religious freedom. 
For at least the past ten years,  PAN ' s  chief stronghold has been 
the northern Mexican states which enj oy a measure of freedom from cen-
tral control because of their distance from Mexico City. Although no 
reliable voting f igures are available, it is likely that if vot�s were 
to be counted honestly, PAN would command significant popular electoral 
94Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change , "  op. cit . ,  102. 
95Ibid. See also William P .  Tucker , the Mexican Government Today, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957 ) ,  60. 
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maj orities in Chihuahua , Sonora , and Baj a California Norte. 
In that it is mainly middle-and-upper-class ,  conservative, and 
96 church-oriented , PAN obviously falls outside the guidelines which 
this writer has set for a radical opposition party in the Latin American 
context . (See Table 4) . Thus it cannot be stated that support for 
PAN is a reliable indicator of political alienation in Mexico . However, 
there are several factors, at least one of which is unique to the 
Mexican situation, which must be considered before drawing any conclu-
sions . First there is the virtual "one-party" structure in Mexico 
which almost by definition makes any viable opposition party a threat 
to the stability of that structure. Second, as we will see later, 
leftist groups in Mexico are too fragmented anu disorganized to repre-
sent important vehicles for the expression of politically relevant 
alienation. Third, pronouncements of leading panistas such as Louis 
H .  Alvarez , and Effrain Gonzales Luma and Alej andro Aviles, predicting 
popular violence against the established regime , evidence at least a 
limited commitment to political radicalism, 97 to the extent that panistas 
are denied access to governmental and political participation, it may 
be said that they are physically and ideologically isolated and alienated . 
An incident in Baja California serves to illustrate the operational 
status of the PAJ.� opposition in Mexico . Prior to the gubernatorial 
election of 1959 in Baja California, the incumbent governor , Braulio 
96Tucker , op . cit . ,  5 9 .  
97Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Chang e , "  op . cit . ,  103-
105 . 
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Maldonado Sandez ,  issued a public declaration that strict controls 
would be placed upon the polls due to an alleged importation of guns 
by PAN from the United States for the purpose of a forcible take-over 
of the state government of Baja California. It was further alleged 
that the directives from PAN authorized the seizure of power by any 
means ; that Louis H .  Alvarez issued these instructions on behalf of 
his party and that they were reissued by Hugo Gutierrez Vega and 
Salvador Rosas Magallon. That these charges were improbable is most 
likely consicl ering the fact of overwhelming PRI control of the means 
of forceful coercion within Mexico. Informants in Baja California 
stated , in personal interviews , that the Governor ' s  decision to create 
an atmosphere of crisis the day before the election (August 2 ,  1959) 
was calculated to frighten women voters (who were assumed likely to 
be influenced by pro-PAN church propaganda) away from the polls by 
fabricating an atmosphere of imminent violence.  The PRI officially 
declared a 2-1 victory in that election which acknowledged latent 
support for PAN among the electorate.  In view of dishonest vote­
counting, PAN support may have been considerable. 98 
It appears from this discussion that Mexico presents us with a 
unique case where a conservative party is the main vehicle for ex-
pressing urban political alienation. However , before making any final 
conclusions it is first necessary to examine other Mexican political 
parties and movements which are, at least to some extent , urban oriented . 
98Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change , "  op . cit . ,  
106-107 . 
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Minority opposition parties. Although PAN is by far the strongest 
and most promising of Mexico ' s  opposition partie s ,  it is not the only 
organized alternative for expression of political alienation. There 
is a PNN (Partido Nacionalista de Mexico) ,  which seeks to unite the 
Mexican Revolution with Christianity by a comprehensive reins tatement 
of the Church. To the far right of this group is the UNS (Union 
Nacional Sinarquista) , a loosely organized group of Catholic fascists 
who allegedly perpetrate acts of terror and violence as a means of 
discrediting official regime s .  One writer contends that PAN has been 
partially coopted into the Mexican single-party system and that UNS 
now serves as the principal catalyst for articulation of alienated 
restorationist sentiment in Mexico . 99 Although UNS is growing, it is 
not yet strong enough to compete with PAN as a politically relevant 
rightest alienate. That i s ,  the alienation expressed by UNS is not 
yet of sufficient magnitude to pose a threat (latent , incipient , or 
actual) _to the stability of the Mexican political system. 
Practically an adjunct of the controlling party (PRI) is the 
PARM (Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana) , which claims to 
be the remaining segment of authentic revolutionary zeal stemming 
from the "real" revolution which began under Morelos in 1810. 
In addition to these political groupings , there are in Mexico 
a number of other formations which call themselves parties and whose 
leadership is difficult to ascertain at all times . Most of these 
99Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political 
Alienation in Mexico,"  op . cit . , 661 . 
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would be described as left-of-center and include FOR (Federacion 
Obrera Revolucionaria) ,  IL:E (Lirga Leninista Esparataco) , POCM 
(Partido Obrero Compesino Mexicano) , and MLN (Movimiento de 
Liberacion Nacional) . The MLN, which is today splintered and 
discordant , was created from the impotent Mexican Communist Party 
(PCM) , lOO the moderate ,  often pro-government , Peoples Socialist 
Party (PPS) , and the POCM. 101 In June, 1962, Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, the leader of PPS, publicly declared his party no longer 
associated with the MLN because of the profound differences between 
the two "with respect to the nature of such a movement . 11102 Ob-
viously , it might be concluded that factionalism has been and will 
continue to be characteristic of the Mexican lef t .  What then has 
caused the failing of the Communists and other leftists in Mexico? 
One authority on Latin American Communism states that : 
The fundamental reason for the failure of the Communists 
to make significant headway in Mexico has undoubtedly 
been the fact that they have been busy trying to sell 
a foreign revolution to a country which was going 
through a fundamental revolutionary change of its own . 
In constantly advertising the virtues of a Communist 
revolution a la Soviet Union, the Mexican Communists 
were not only running counter to the trend of events 
in Mexico itself , but were also defying the patriotism 
of the Mexican people, for whom their own revolution 
had become synonomous with present-day Mexico. 103 
lOOKarl M.  Schmit t ,  "Communism in Mexico , "  Western Political 
Quarterly , Vol. 15 (March, 1962) , 112-115 . 
101navid T .  Garza , "Factionalism in the Mexican Left: The 
Frustration of the MLN," Western Political Quarterly , (September ,  
1964) , 450. 
lOZibid . , 451. 
103Robert J .  Alexander , Communism in Latin America, (New Bruns­
wick: Rutgers University Press, 1957) , 348 . 
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The Communists have also failed to find themselves a real leader 
who can identify with the masses . The nearest proximation, Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano , came from the intellectual class, not from the 
military or the workers. He has lived in opulent style and has never 
dared to break with the Government. As a consequence the workers 
have considered him merely another politician, with undertones of 
104 insincerity and opportunism. However , it should be pointed out 
that Toledano ' s  PPS is probably most significant among the splinter 
parties of the left in Mexico . Toledano has been able to mount some 
support in both urban and rural areas through the endorsements of such 
popular figures as the artist, David Alfaro Siquieros (currently 
incarcerated for a seditious crime known as el delito de dissolucion 
105 social) . Lombardo draws organized support from the UGOCM, a union 
of workers and peasants which he founded. UGOCM has undertaken inva-
sions of private property both rural and urban by paracaidistos or 
squatters whose land needs have not been satisfied in Mexico ' s  ej ido 
program of land reform. 
Finally, another important reason that the Communists have failed 
in Mexico is that the PRI has been primarily interested in coopting 
lef t-wing rather than right-wing dissidence and has thus concentrated 
its efforts on the Communists and Socialists. The PRI wishes to be 
regarded as the only legitimate heir to the Mexican Revolution. In 
this sense the dominant party realizes that the conservative groups · 
104s .  W. Washington, "Mexican Resistance to Communism," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April , 1958) , 505 . 
105 Johnson, "Urbanization .and Political Change," op . c it . ,  109.  
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which were bitterly opposed to the revolution pose no real threat.  Left-
106 wing dissidents , however, could challenge the PRI on its own ground . 
If we are to believe the literature available in the United States , then 
we might conclude that the PRI s trategy has been successful . However , it 
should be noted that the PRI probably has very tight control over the 
literature that goes out of Mexico , and it may be that this writer is 
grossly underestimating the potency of the Mexic�n left. If the latter 
is true it is hoped that future researchers will be able to provide a 
more balanced analysis in this aspect. 
An urban civic protest movement. Other evidences of alienation in 
Mexican urban areas have recently appeared in the form of independent 
civic protest movements against established urban regimes . These groups 
have preferred to remain aloof from the established political parties and , 
though protesting abuses of official (PRI) state governments, contain 
supporters of PRI , PAN and other parties. The case of the Derrama del 
Chuviscar is significant here for it relates both to political alienation 
and to related problems of fiscal mobilization in urban areas. 
La Derrama de Chuviscar , freely translated as the Reassessment of 
Chuviscar , was the beginning of a citizens' movement in the city of 
Chihuahua to prevent collection of a special public works assessment by 
the municipal and state governments. On December 31, 1961, the state 
government organ, Periodico Oficial, published the text of a decree fixing 
the amount of a special assessment to be levied upon the proprietors of 
106Bo Anderson and James D .  Cockcroft,  "Control and Cooptation in ,, 
Mexican Politics,"  in Irving L.  Horowitz and Josue de Castro and John 
Gerassi, (eds . ) ,  Latin American Radicalism, (New York : Vintage Books , 
1969) , 380. 
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urban properties in the Rio Chuviscar area for the purpose of paving 
the riverbed , installing urban utilities nearby, and of building bridges. 
The property owners contended that the state government originally had 
been ceded the land by the federal government and that the state had in 
turn sold t12 land for an estimated 33,000,000 pesos . This price, 
according to the property owners , had included the cost of improvements 
for which they were now being reassessed . 107 
In early January , 196 2 ,  the property owners of the Chuviscar 
neighborhood ,  now calling themselves the Associacion Civica de Usarios 
de Servicios Publicos de Chihuahua (ACUSP) sent several telegrams to the 
President of the Republic urging his good off ices in solving the dispute. 
The ACUSP finally won relief in May , 1962 , when it successfully sought a 
jutio de amparo in the Federal District Court for Chihuahua enj oining 
collection of the tax by state or municipal officials . l08 
The Chihuahua citizens movement is not an isolated example. At 
the present time another citizens ' movement is getting underway in 
Cuernayaca ,  capital city of Morelas. 
The Migrant ' s  Role in Mexican Urban Political Alienation. The 
backdoor approach (for example locating institutional sources of political 
alienation and linking this alienation to particular groups such as the 
new urbanites) which has been utilized by this writer in the preceding 
107Johnson , Kenneth F . , Urbanization and Political Change in Latin 
America . Ph.D.  dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles , 
op . cit . ,  pgs . 111-112 . 
lOSibid . ,  112 .  
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discussion, yields two immediate conclusions . First, the urban c ivic 
protest movement described above was unlikely to have included many 
recent migrants because its membership was limited primarily to relatively 
well-to-do property owners. (Of course , this is an isolated case and 
may or may not be representative with respect to membership . )  Second , 
Mexico ' s  principal opposition party, PAN, is basically middle- and upper-
class and· thus unlikely to attract rural-urban migrants ,  most of which 
are unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers . The following table bears 
out the second point . The total for opposition party preference among 
migrants is only four percent compared to ten percent for urban-born. 
Furthermore, the voting for an opposition party was considerably higher 
among the urban-born (17 percent) than among the migrants (10 percent) . 
The following evidence will show that other variables measuring political 
alienation and political radicalization also indicate that the migrants 
are less radical than the metropolitans and the urban-born. 
Migrant politicization. Levels of migrant politicization are 
crucial in determining the condition of stability or instability in 
rapidly expanding urban areas. Before people engage in political action, 
radical or otherwise, they must be at least minimally politicized -
that is,  they must at least perceive the relevance of government to their 
lives. 109 But perception must be also accompanied by activity. Thus 
this conception of politicization takes on both a cognitive (or 
perceptual) aspect and a behavioral (pr active) aspect. 110 In Table 
l09Goldrich in Heath and Adams , op . cit . ,  361 . 
110oaniel Goldric�, Sons of the Establishment , (Chicago : Rand 
McNally, 1966) , 11.  
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Table 16111 
Alienation and Political Radicalization Measured by 
Opposition Party Preference and 
Voting in Mexico 
Indicator Migrants by Length of Urban Residence All 
(in �ears) Mi gr-
ants 




PAN 6% 5% 2% 0 5% 3% 
pp 0 0 0 1% 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 2 0 1 
Opposition 
party 









a Among those expressing a party preferenc e .  The PP is not the PPS 
(Partido Popular Socialists) . 
b For the candidate of the PAN in the 1958 presidential elections 
among those voting . For all practical purposes, "opposition voting" 
in 1958 was limited to PAN, since the PP and another splinter 
party the PARM, supported the official party ' s  candidate for presi­
dent . The Communist Party ' s  candidate received fewer than 10,000 
write-in votes. 
* Too few cases. 
111cornelius, op . cit . ,  853 . Also , for an interpretation of · 
Cornelius ' s  findings see Barry A:nes , "Bases of Support for Mexico ' s  
Dominant Party , "  The American Political Science Review, Vol. 6 4 ,  
(March, 1970) , 166.  
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17 we find that among both migrant and urban-born populations less 
than half of the respondents have attained even minimal levels of 
politicization and that the migrants as a whole exhibit lower cogni-
tion than the urban born. 
Table 17112 
Politicization: Cognitive 
:.� .. dicator Migrants by Length of All Mi- Urban-
Urban Residence (in years) grants Born 








effect 2% 2% 3% 4% 6% 4% 8% 
Some 
effect 20 14 32 24 28 25 24 
None 78 84 65 7 2  67 71 68 
Examination of the data on a behavioral indicator of politicization 
reveals essentially the same pattern. Furthermore , both cognitive and 
behavioral indicators point to the �act that recent migrants (two or 
less years residence) are less politicized than the group we might define 
as the marginals (five to twenty years residence) . This provides further 
1 1 2cornelius, op.  cit . ,  848 .  
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substantiation for the marginal theory as opposed to the recent 
migrant theory. 
Table 18 1 13 
Politicization: Behavioral 
Migrants by Length of All Urban-
Indicator Urban Residence Mi gr- Born 
(in years) ant s .  
0-2 2-4 5-9 10-19 2o+ 
Membership 
in politi-




Legitimacy orientations of migrants .  Perhaps a more important 
threat to the stability of the Mexican political system than migrant 
politicization levels is the development of nonsupportive , alienated 
attitudes and orientations toward the system among the migrant masses. 
Cornelius ' s  data on legitimacy orientations of rural-urban migrants 
in Mexico (Table 19) do not suggest any widely-shared attitude potential 
which could provide the basis for political radicalism and instability. 
The migrant respondents in general demonstrate a relatively high level 
of system affect , in fact, higher in all cases than the urban-born res­
pondents . 114 Again the evidence suggests that the recent migrants (two 
113 Cornelius, op . cit . , 849.  
1 14nata on system effect provided by Kahl ' s  Measurement of 
Modernism survey provide further substantiation for this point . See 




Item Migrants by Length of 
Urban Residence 
(in years) 
0-2 2-4 5-9 
1 .  Regards poli-
tical system as 
chief object of 41% 23% 25% 
personal pride 
as a Mexican. 
2 .  Evaluation of 
extent to which 
the ideals and pur- I poses of the Mexi-
can Revolution 
have been realized . 
Ideals have been 26% 36% 38% 
realized . 
Ideals have been 16% 18% 3% 
forgotten. 
Don ' t  know . 5% 0 3% 
3 .  "Do you think 
that (the official 
party ' �  policies & 
activities would 
ever seriously 
endanger the nat ' l  
welfare?" 
Probably happen. 11% 14% 9% 
Might happen. 36% 38% 20% 
Probably not happen. 39% 36% 39% 
Don ' t  know. 14% 12% 33% 













33% 31% 28% 
19% 23% 21% 
10% 10% 16% 
5% 5% 5% 
10% 10% 12% 
25% 29% 28% 
39% 37% 43%• 
26% 24% 17% 
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or less years of residence) are more supportive of t9e political 
system than the marginals .  
Support for protest demonstrations . In order to evaluate the 
extent to which non-supportive legitimacy orientations and feelings 
of alienation are translated into action we may examine support for 
opposition movements and demonstrations . (Evidence concerning support 
for oppositipn parties has previously been introduced . )  Once more 
Cornelius ' s  data for his migrant sample (Table 20) suggest a low level 
Table 201 16 Support for Protest Demonstrations 
Indicator 
1
�1igrants by Length of All Urban-
Urban Residence Migrants Born 
(in years) 
0-2 2-4 5-9 10-19 2o+ 
Regards protest 
demonstrations 







as the least 
effective met- 59% 23% 26% 38% 4% 37% 51% 
hod of inf lu-
encing a govern-
ment decision. 
of potential support for such movem��ts among the migrants .  Only nine 
percent of all the migrants regard protest demonstrations as the most 
effective way to influence government decisions ; some 37 percent believe 
1 1 6cornelius , op . cit . ,  853 . 
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this form to be the least effective method . Certainly this supports 
the previous assertion made that migrants are unlikely participants 
in urban civic protest movements such as the ACUSP . Also , as on 
other indicators previously mentioned , the data from Table 20 suggest 
a higher level of potential support for radical activity among the 
marginals than among the migrants .  
Mexico ' s  second generation. It is important to note that all 
of the data which has been presented was gathered from the responses 
of the adult Mexican migrants . In a country where over 60 percent of 
the population is under 25 years of age, it seems the children of the 
migrants deserve some attention too. 117 Unfortunately there is no data, 
to this writer ' s  knowledge at least, on politicization an<l legitimacy 
orientation levels which measure the responses of the second generation. 
(Obviously , this would be an excellent focus for future original 
research . )  However , there are indications (none well documen.ted enough 
to report) of protest activity among Mexican secondary level students 
enrolled in vocational schools118 (certainly a likely place to find 
sons of migrants) . The high potential for radical political activity 
that this second generation possesses should not be overlooked in 
future studies related to this topic. 
Conclusions. As previously stated, the case of Mexico presents 
additional substantiation for this writer ' s  hypothesis I and II . Econo-
117 "Mexico 1968 : A Study of Domination and Repression," (New 
York: The North American Congress on Latin America, 1968) , 24 . 
118Ibid . ,  5 .  
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mic frustration and socio-psychological adjustment problems among 
migrants are far less common than some "urban-instability" theorists 
would have us believe . In addition, the evidence presented in this 
chapter supports hypotheses III,  IV, and V .  Political alienation and 
political radicalism, particularly as measured by party preference 
and participation, are not characteristic of the rural-urban migrants 
in Mexico. Finally, this data suggests that the marginals are more 
likely to engage in radical political activity than the migrants .  
One writer points out that the key to Mexic o ' s  future stability 
lies in the solution of the social and economic problems of her 
growing urban areas, where the potential for alienation, political 
instability, and outright insurgency is most acute. 119 In this sense 
Mexico provides a good case study for this paper. Table 3 indicates, 
of the three main countries (Mexico , Chile ,  and Venezuela) focused 
upon in this paper , Mexico (-.36) ranks lowest on system stability . 
However , in providing an open environment which permits expressions 
of political radicalism, Mexico , dominated by a one-party structure, 
is a less appropriate study than either Chile or Venezuela , which are 
the subj ects of the next chapter . Chile has been chosen because it 
has a multi-party system which permits Communist participation. Al-
though the Communist party in Venezuela is not presently allowed 
electoral participation, there is data from the 1958 elections (when 
the party was legal) which merits study. In addition, Venezuela has 
119K.  F .  Johnson, "Mexico , "  in Ben G .  Burnett and K. F .  Johnson 
(eds . ) ,  Political Forces in Latin America : Dimensions of the uest 
for Stability, Belmont, Calif . :  Wadsworth Publishing Company , 1970) , 
58. 
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been chosen because it has one of the highest urbanization rates in 
L . Am i 120 atin er ca . 
120 Between 1940 and 1950 the approximate percentage of the 
urban growth due to migration in Venezuela was 71 percent . See 
Hauser , op . cit . ,  110. 
Chapter IV. 
The Migrants in Venezuelan and Chilean Politicti 
By expanding the scope of this study to include the Venezuelan 
and Chilean political systems , it is proposed that a broader, and 
far more representative, analysis of Latin American migrant political 
behavior will be possible. At the same time, the· method of approach 
used will also be broadened . In addition to the discussion of mi-
grant politics from the perspective of the large urban center , the 
following material will also focus on one of the most important Latin 
American urban sub-systems--the shantytown. 
Peripheral shantytowns have become as much a hallmark of most 
Latin American capitals and large industrial cities as central plazas . 
Estimates of the number of families who live in these shantytowns 
vary , but the figure was approximately 4 . 5  million in 1962 . Population 
growth and rural-to-urban migration have greatly swelled the number 
since.  One analyst estimates that shantytowns are now growing at the 
121 staggering rate of 15 percent per year . For the study of rural-to-
urban migration, the shantytowns , which ring most of the capitals and 
other South American cities, provide an excellent unit of analysis. 
121William L .  Flinn, The Process of Migration to a Shantytown 
in Bogot� , Colombia, Research Publication No . 49 (University of 
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center , Autumn 1968) , 77 . 
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Most shantytown residents are migrants and marginals . 
In the following discussion, the approach used to study the 
Venezuelan shantytowns (or barrios as they are called in this case) 
will be primarily descriptive ; while that used to study Chilean 
shantytowns (callampas) will be both descriptive and empirical. An 
analysis of election data from the larger urban perspective will 
conclude the case studies of Venezuela and Chile . 
Migrant Politics : The Local Perspective 
The Barrios of Venezuela. The people of Venezuela are passing 
through a critical phase of their history. At the same time that 
they are undergoing the strenuous task of developing into � modern, 
industrial nation, they are also trying to forge an effective and 
stable democracy out of political traditions that for centuries have 
been authoritarian. 122 One of the elements in today ' s  society that 
will play an important role in determining the success or f aiiure of 
Venezuela ' s  attempt at political reform �s the people of the barrios--
the dwellers of the vast shantytowns that blanket the fringes of every 
maj or city. 
The history of the formation of the barrios falls into three fairly 
well defined stages which correspond to the various waves of migra-
tion of Gl'.mpesinos (poor peasants) into the urban areas. Their 
migration has tended to respond sensitively to both rapid economic 
122For a general discussion of the course of Venezuela's  social 
and political development see Frank Bonilla and Jose A .  Silva Michelena 
(eds . ) ,  The Politics of Change in Venezuela: Vol. I, A Strategy for 
Research on Social Policy. (Cambridge , Mass . :  The M . I . T .  Press, 1967) . 
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development and transferals of political power.  
The first major wave of migration was triggered by a political 
event , the coup of October 1945 that brought down the regime of 
/ 
General Isaias Medina Angarita and established in its stead the first 
administration in Venezuela ' s  history that actively sought the support 
of the populace .  For the landless campesino , who until then had been 
ignored by the successive governments ,  this marked the dawn of a new 
era. Many took advantage of the aura of freedom that suddenly pre-
vailed to gather their belongings and travel into the cities (usually 
either Caracas or the oil towns in the Oriente) where they expected 
the new government would be anxious to respond to their desire for 
jobs , free land , and education. Unable to afford the luxury of 
moving into established residential areas, the new arrivals organized 
themselves in groups and settled clandestinely on vacant land that 
was either publicly or privately owned . The "ranchos" (as the shacks 
are called in Venezuela) that the migrants built represented their 
claims to the seized property. This process of illegal settlement is 
commonly called an "invasion" and it is the method by which almost all 
barrios have been formed . 123 
The second wave of migration ran approximately from 1950 through 
1957 . Although this period roughly corresponds to the years that 
" , 
President Marcos Perez Jimenez exercised complete control over national 
politic s ,  the stimulating effects of rapid economic development were 
more than enough to offset the restrictions imposed by the dictator, 
123Talton F .  Ray , op.  cit . ,  4-5. 
7 7  
and the rate of urbanization further accelerated . The third and 
latest wave of migration began in January 1958 with the overthrow 
/ , 
of the Perez �imenez regime . When the leaders of the Revolution 
turned the government over to a popularly oriented military-civilian 
junta , the movement of cqmpesinos toward the cities, which thus far 
had been substantial by any standards , suddenly grew to tremendous 
proportions . So concentrated was the trend that today more barrios 
trace their origin back to those first twenty-four months following 
the Revolution than to any other period . 
When measured against the experience of other Latin American 
countries, migration to Venezuela ' s  barrios has been extraordinary . 
These barrios today house between one-third and three-quarters of th� 
populations of their respective cities. Official estimates indicate 
the following percentages for some of the major cities: Caraca s ,  35 
percent ; Maracaibo , 50 percent ; Maracay , 70 percent ; Puerto La Cruz , 
44 percent ; Cuman� , 63 percent . 124 
Economic life in the barrio . For one accustomed to the planned 
expansion of urban centers by the gradual extension of paved streets, 
water mains , sewer systems , and the construction of buildings and 
houses , it is difficult to imagine a community of 3-5,000 persons 
annexing itself to a city almost overnight without any of the . city ' s  
surveyors ,  architects, contractors ,  bankers , and carpenters participa-
ting in its development . Such is the case with most barrios ,  which 
124charles Abrams , Man ' s  Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing 
World , (Cambridge, Mass . :  The M . I . T .  Press, 1964) , 13 . 
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are brought into existenc e ,  autonomously as it were , with little or 
no help from the outside business world . Like a new barrio , the 
newly arrived migrant is also at first detached from the urban economy . 
Private industries have few recruiting programs that go into the barrio 
looking for prospective employees .125 Thu s ,  as a result ,  barrio resi-
dents who are interested in working for large organizations must 
search out this kind of employment on their own. This employment pro-
cedure is not always successful and may be said to generally contribute 
to the precarious economic position of most barrio families in Vene­
zuela . 126 In addition only a few of the unsuccessful private industry 
j ob-seekers demonstrate the ability , or , in some cases even the desire 
to find alternative sources of income . Apparently then, in Venezuela 
the conditions which of ten breed economic frustration among the migrants 
are widely existent; and in this respect it may be said that Venezuela 
is quite unique in the Latin American context . 127 However, i� should 
be pointed out that the rural-urban migrants are not the only group 
in Venezuelan society which experiences deep economic frustration. 
Inequality of income distribution, which is generally characteristic 
of the Venezuelan economy , causes a similar reaction among many of the 
urban born and the immobile rural residents . 128 
125 Ray , op . cit . ,  14 . 
126For example , see Lisa Redfield Peattie, The View from the Barrio, 
(Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1968), 35 . 
127see Chapter II of this paper. 
128 See G. A .  D .  Soares, Economic Development and Political Radi-
calism (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, St.  
Louis , 1964) , 218 . 
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Since it appears that the "migrant economic frustration" 
theorists may at least have a case in Venezuela,  an investigation 
to determine if this frustration finds expression in political 
alienation is necessary . 
Political alienation in the barrio : the party perspective. For 
grievances generally related to economic frustration the most realistic 
means availab.le to the barrio resident for exerting pressure is through 
the opposition political parties. 129 Those are the only organized 
groups available to the barrio man which represent a serious threat or 
challenge to the government because they are the only ones that com-
pete with it for what it really needs in order to exist--votes . For 
our purposes then a description of the primary pa�ties which have held 
office and those which have opposed the government should be helpful , 
particularly by relating their importance to the barrio leve l .  
Thirteen political organizations participated in the Venezuelan 
national elections on December 1 ,  1963 .130 Of the total valid votes , 
94 percent131 was captured by five of the seven parties described below. 
Three of the top five (AD, COPEI, and URD) had been active since 1945-
1946, and the other two (FND and FDP) were founded in 1963 to nominate 
and then support presidential candidates for the election itself . 
Another pair of parties (PCV and MIR) , although excluded by law from 
129Ray, op . cit . ,  9 7 .  
130The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 ,  1963 ,  Part III , (Wash­
ington D .C . :  Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 
1964) , 2 .  
131Ray, op . cit . ,  98 . 
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participating in the elections, has nevertheless in recent years 
played a significant role in national and local politics--and thu s ,  
like the major legal parties , in the dynamics o f  barrio affairs . 
/ I / 
ACCION DEMOCRATICA (AD) . Founded in 1941 by Ro�ulo Betancour t ,  
AD was the dominant force in the government between 1945 and 1948. 132 
I Under its aegis , Romulo Gallegos was elected president in 1947--the 
first man in the nation ' s  history to assume that office as the result 
of a national election. His administration was ended in late 1948 by 
,, a military coup . For ten years under the dictatorship of Perez 
,,, Jimenez which followed , the AD party was outlawed , and many of its 
leaders exiled . AD played an active role in the Revolution of 
January 1958, and at the end of that year its candidate, Betancourt 
himself , won the· presidential elections with 49 . 2  percent of the vote. 
AD and its junior partner governed together from 1960 to 1964 . 
Although ideologically AD can be classified as left of center ,133 
it has been compelled--mainly by its own commitment to the industrializa-
tion of the nation and by the constant and violent pressure from the 
extreme lef t--to adopt goverrunent policies that are more in the center 
of Venezuela's  political spectrum. It is true that at least once 
1
�
2For an in-depth study of AD ,  see John D .  Martz , Acci�n 
Democratica: Evolution of a Modern Political Part in Venezuela 
Princeton, N .J . :  Princeton University Press , 1966) , Also see 
Harry Kantor, "The Development of Accion Democr�tica de Venezuela,"  
Journal of Inter-American Studies (April, 1959) , 237-255 ; and John · 
D .  Martz,  ''Venezuela's  Generation of ' 2 8 :  the Genesis of Political 
Democracy , "  Journal of Inter-American Studies, (January, 1964) , 
17-32 . 
133 Ray, op. cit . ,  99.  
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historically (1948-1957) AD has served as a vehicle for the expression 
of political alienation; however, during the period this writer is 
primarily interested in (the 1960 ' s ) , this party has served as the focus 
for system support . Furthermore , there are other parties (the PCV . and 
MIR) in Venezuelan politics which generally serve as far better indices 
for political alienation and radicalization. 
.. .. 
Accion Democratica ' s  role in barrio politics since. 1959 has been 
a response to the critical fact· that at that time the party received 
most of its electoral support from the compesinos and that its influ-
ence among the urban lower class was generally very weak. The barrios 
were more densely populated and better able to be mobilized for mass 
action than any other sector of society; and if the AD administration 
had failed to cope adequately with them, the extreme leftist parties 
would probably have succeeded in dominating barrio politics, and thus 
have been able to cause enough political instability to justify seizure 
f .  134 o the government . AD approached the problem from three different 
angles . 
First, it sought to strengthen its position by increasing the 
number of its barrio members. Following the 1958 elections , AD leaders 
launched a nationwide campaign of reorganization and recruitment in the 
barrio s .  Around the core o f  faithful members then available , they 
systematically built up a vast network of formal membership groups .  
,, Known as "comites de barrios , "  these groups have become the base units 
134Ray, op.  cit . ,  111. 
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of the party organization in the urban areas, and their headquarters 
are now found in virtually every barrio in the country. 
The second approach AD used to attack the problem of its weak-
ness in the barrios was to seek control over organized community 
leadership by dominating the j untas and molding them into instruments 
of its governing policies. Previously leadership in the great 
maj ority of barrios was in the hands of the Communists . 135 
. / � For example , in 1958 Accion Democratica received less than 15 
percent of the votes in the Federal District (which includes most of 
metropolitan Caracas) and ran fourth , behind URD, PCV, and COPEI. 
In 1959 Caracas ' Municipal Council , junta federation . and the individual 
j untas were all dominated by representatives or friends of URD and 
PCV . However , in the spring of 1962 , working through the governors 
office, AD set about forming a new federation of j unatas in the barrios .  
This federation was known as the Movimiento Pro-Desarrollo de la 
Comunidad. The Movimiento was so successful that when the 1962 elec-
tions were held to select j unt� members in several key Caracas barrio s ,  
the resulting juntas were organized around three members o f  COPEI (AD ' s  
coalition partner at the time) , three members of AD, and one independent . 
I I Accion Democratica also used a third approach in its attempt to 
improve its position in the barrios. Toward the end of the third year 
of the Betancourt administration (early in 1962) , it began openly to 
sponsor urban conununity development . 
135 Ray , op. cit . ,  114 . 
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If one were to assess the overall effect of the AD strategy to 
guide the political role of the barrio dwellers and to build up 
the party ' s  strength in that sector, probably the most useful yard-
stick would be the national elections of 1963 . That the elections 
were held on schedule in December 1963 and that Betancourt was able 
to remain in off ice until completion of his term the following February 
are in themselves maj or accomplishments to AD ' s  credit. It is obvious 
that the party ' s  measures had greatly undermined the influence of the 
extreme left in the barrios and that fact in turn was largely the 
reason the barrios did not play a more aggressive role during the five 
years between 1958 and 1963 . There was, furthermore ,  the very encour-
aging fact that attendence at the elections was high: 92 percent . This 
high percentage represented a firm repudiation by the electorate of 
the extreme left ' s  methods of expressing political dissatisfaction, 
since the two illegalized parties -- the Communist PCV and the MIR 
had called for a general boycott of the elections to demonstrate 
popular rejection of the Betancourt regime. 
PARTIDO SOCIAL CRISTIANO (COPE!) . Founded in 194 6 ,  its leader 
has always been Rafael Caliera, who was its presidential candidate in 
1958 when the party won 15 percent of the vote. 136 COPEI has a repu-
tation of being the "best educated" party, and it points to the large 
number of lawyers among its members to support this:lmage. It was 
originally a very conservative organization, but over the years it· 
136venezuela Election Factbook, December, 1963 , (Washington D . C . : 
Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems) , 17 . 
· 
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moved to the left and now advocates a progressive program consistent 
with Christian Democratic reformism. 137 COPEI, however , is still 
too far right to be considered politically radical.  
Traditionally, the bulk of COPEI ' s  support had come from the 
Andean states, but since 1958 the party has been able to build up 
strength nationally, particularly among middle-class women. Though 
it has a highly dedicated core of workers in the barrios , its appeal 
in that sector has not yet pro· �<l to be great. Taking advantage of 
serious splits in both AD and the URD ,  Copei was able to win the 
presidential election of 1968 and Rafael Caldera took office as 
President of Venezuela in a peaceful transfer of power from AD in 
March of 196 9 .  Election data from this election were not available 
for analysis in this study. 
/ / I UNION REPUBLICANA DEMOCRATICA (URD) . Founded in 1945 by Govito 
Villalba , URD was in 1952 the largest and most powerful opposition 
party in Venezuela . 138 
I , During the Perez �imenez dictatorship when 
AD was outlawed , URD won the national elections of 1952, although 
I ' the results were immediately nullified by Perez J;imenez.  With 
' I Wolfgang Larrazabal , the president of the Provisional Government, as 
its candidate in the 1958 election, URD got 26 . 8  percent of the con-
gressional vote, mainly because of big majorities in the principal 
cities (60 percent , for instanc e ,  in the Federal District) . The 
137see Venezuela Election Factbook, December 1 ,  1968 , (ICOPS) , 18.  
138L. B.  Lott , "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections : A Lesson for 1957 ,"  
Western Political Quarterly , (September, 1957) , 544 . 
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political ideology of URD has drifted about and it is thus difficult 
to label the party in any consistent way. From 1960 to 1962 , URD 
actively opposed AD and COPEI , and , in fact, aligned itself on many 
issues with the Communist party and MIR. However, in 1963 it joined 
a new coalition with AD and FND, and today its political ideology is 
not significantly different from AD ' s .  In this respect ,  URD support 
is not the best indice for political radicalism in the case of Vene-
zuela. 
The 1958 elections showed that URD was much the strongest party 
I 
in the barrio s ,  but since its dissociation from Larrazabal, who became 
the nucleus of a new party, FOP in 1963 , barrio support for URD has 
diminished substantially. 
J 
FRENTE NACIONAL DEMOCRATICA (FND) . Organized in 1963 as Indepen-
dientes Pro-Frente Nacional (IPFN) to support the candidacy of Arturo 
Uslar Pietri, it changed its name shortly after the elections . Pietri 
appealed to the electorate principally on the basis of his reputation 
as a candidate with no commitments to any of the traditional parties. 
On most issues he was slightly to the right of center , 139 and thus 
could not be considered a radical force in Venezuelan politics . 
In the 1963 elections Uslai won 16 percent of the presidential 
vote, while his party got 13 percent of the congressional vote. The 
most consistent support came from the urban middle classes , though in 
the large cities of the ceutral states many barrio votes were attracted 
139Ray, op.  cit . ,  101 � 
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as well .  
, 
FUERZA DEMOCRATICA POPUL.An. (FDP) . The party was founded in 
I 
1963 by J'orge Dager, an ex-AD and ex-MIR member, to prepare for the 
, 
coming elections in support of the candidacy of Wolfgang Larrazabal , 
who had been the president of the Provisional Government and the URD 
nominee in 1958. FDP propose� a more radical program than any of the 
I other legal parties, and Larrazabal was the only candidate to make a 
maj or issue of imperialism. His campaign was directed almost entirely 
to the barrios .  Approximately four-fifths of FDP ' s  9 . 9  percent of the 
total vote came from metropolitan Caracas , · Maracay, Valencia, and 
Maracaibo. 
PARTIDO COMUNISTA VENEZOLANA (PCV) and MOVIMIENTO DE IZQUIERDA 
REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR) . The Communist party, the PCV, first organized 
in 1931 ,  began to play an especially significant part in Venezuela ' s  
political life during the Perez .I:imenez dictatorship , when a semi-
underground group of its members,. the so-called Black Communists,  was 
able to extend its influence into the labor unions and the field of 
secondary and higher education. 140 The party was active in the 1958 
, Revolution, and later that year supported the candidacy of Larrazal:a.! l .  
PCV got 6 . 2  percent of the party vote. It was not invited to partici-
pate in the post-1958 coalition and in 1960 it was j o ined in extreme 
opposition by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria , the Marxist 
youth movement which, under the leadership of Domingo Alberto Rangel, 
140Robert J .  Alexander , Communism in Latin America , op . cit . , 
267-268 . 
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had just broken off from AD .  Together , members of the two parties 
PCV and MIR, launched an anti-government campaign of rural and urban 
guerilla warfare which was conducted under the name of the Fuerzas 
/ 14 1 Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) . The government suspended 
their right to operate openly as political parties in 1962 , and 
finally made them illegal the following year. 
Both tactics and propaganda of the far left parties made it 
clear that they considered the people of the barrios one of the keys 
to their success. The barrios ,  along with the university students , 
had been the sector of society which participated most actively and 
enthusiastically in the Revolution of 1958. Moreover , it was the 
barrio dwellers who were suffering most from the economic depression 
into which the country had fallen after 1958. Consequently, leaders 
of the urban guerilla campai0n had high expectations of the barrio 
people ' s  participation. 
However , the strategy of PCV and MIR did not produce the results 
for which it had been designed. In fact , as their extremist campaign 
got under way, their influence and prestige among the barrio people 
began to decline noticeably , reaching a low point at the end of 1963 , 
as was so clearly reflected by the public response to the December 
elections . Three factors appear to have had a direct bearing on the 
extreme leftist parties ' loss of support . 
First , the calculation of the barrios "ripeness" for revolt was 
141For a description of terrorist activities of FALN see B .  
Taper,  "Letter from Caracas: tactics of FALN , "  New Yorker , (March 6 ,  
1965) , 101-143. 
88 
grossly inaccurate. It reflected a serious misreading of the people ' s  
attitudes a.•d grievances . One assumption on which the campaign was 
apparently based was that many , or most ,  barrio dwellers were .no 
longer willing to tolerate the physical and economic .conditions under 
which they lived and hence were prep�red to fight for rapid change. 
However, such a view represented the essentially middle-class perspec­
tive of the leaders of the revolutionary parties who projected their 
own impression of wretchedness and misery into the minds of the barrio 
people. It did not recognize that the criteria by which barrio people 
j udged their own welfare and advancement were very different from those 
associated with the modern urban way of life. 
In addition, the FALN ' s  urban guerrilla warfare proved to be a 
grave tactical error. Its success in creating a climate of uneasiness 
and , to a lesser extent , generating a feeling of hostility toward the 
government ' s  methods of repression was more than offset by the mood of 
revulsion that developed in the barrio s .  Terrorist activities struck 
much too close to home for barrio families to look on dispassionately 
at the fate of the victims . 
Finally the combined government and AD offensive played a decisive 
role in weakening the influence of the extreme left in the barrios . 
The Communists and miristas were fired by the Ministry of Education, 
squeezed out of the government posts, and generally removed from posi­
tions of power . 
Using extreme political party (PCV and MIR) preference and support 
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as indices of radicalism then, it appears that in the 1960 ' s  Vene-
zuelan barrio residents have not been generally disposed to engage in 
disruptive political activity. This is primarily because AD ' s  barrio 
strategy has been better calculated than that of PCV and MIR, and as 
a result far more successful . 
The case oi Venezuela suggests something quite significant about 
migrant radicalism which may have some applicability for other Latin 
American countries. When migrants do serve as a radical political 
force, it is usually because they have been organized through · outside 
pressure (such as middle-class PCV leaders) rather than because of 
any real assertiveness on the part of the barrio resid�nts themselves .  
The most obvious explanation for this lack o� assertiveness is 
the barrio people ' s  diffidence toward direct and unsanctioned political 
action, a characteristic which seems to be largely the consequence of 
their lack of confidence in themselves as political actors and insecur­
ity in the ominous presence of "authority . 11142 
Robert Scott ' s  analysis of the psychological barriers to political 
participation among Mexicans applies very well to Venezuelan barrio 
residents.  He writes : 
"The lack of a feeling of personal effectiveness affects 
political competence. Although the sense of inadequacy 
is masked behind a facade of high cognitive self-appraisal , 
the performance of most persons in the political process 
is consistent with their deeper self-image .  The sense of 
and desire for dependency encourage relation to the output 
function; the sense of inadequacy reduces evaluation of 
self as a political actor and limits participation on the 
142 Ray , o p .  cit . ,  152 . 
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input side . 11 143 
The lack of confidence that is characteristic of most barrio 
dwellers, particularly vis-a-vis their political roles, is further 
manifested in their diffidence toward "authority", a nebulous concept 
whose presence is always felt in the barrio s .  Authority is usually 
identified with government officials and is sensed as much by the 
leaders as by_ the people in general. However, where j untas are 
strong and government-supported, they can also represent authority 
to the rest of the community. Well aware that authority is capable 
of causing them damage, people are very reluctant to take any public 
action that might offend i t .  
I t  seems clear that the barrio dwellers '  influence on Venezuelan 
politics thus far has resulted not nearly so much from their own 
actions as from their potential for action. Except during January 
1958 the barrio people have not actively asserted themselves on their 
own behalf , nor have they forced changes in current developments .  At 
the same time , despite constant prompting by leaders of the extreme 
lef t ,  their political behavior has been notably nonviolent and 
generally non-radical .  
In the following discussion it is the writer ' s  purpose to deter-
mine by means of a more empirical approach if similar conclusions 
may be reached for the shantytown dwellers in Chile. 
143Robert E S t t  • co , 
Lucian W .  Pye and Sidney 
Development ,  (Princeton, 
357.  
"Mexico : The Established Revolution , "  in 
Verba, (eds . ) ,  Political Culture and Political 
N .J . :  Princeton University Press, 1965) , 356-
9 1  
The Callampas of Chile. The local analysis in Chile will focus 
on two lower-class settlements on the urban periphery of Santiago . 
Both of these settlements have been recently established , are permanent , 
and have obtained or are in the process of obtaining legal title to 
the land. 
Population growth and , more importantly , urbanization (that is 
rural-urban migrati<>n) have been primarily responsible for the creation 
of these settlements .  Their prevailing image among middle and upper-
class people is that of a slum. It is an image of apathy , misery, 
filth, crime , delinquency , prostitution, and family disintegration. 
It is also commonplace to view these areas as breeding-grounds for 
political instability and extremism. In the face of their reputation 
for social disorganization, these settlers reveal remarkably little 
of i t ;  crime , promiscuity, broken homes occur infrequently, particu-
larly in comparison with the traditional city slums . In addition 
these communities display a prevailing orientation toward law and 
order. 144 
The first settlement to be discussed, 3 de Mayo , is a callampa 
established apparently with little public notice about 1960 in the 
Santiago periphery , the location and layout of which have been deemed 
appropriate by the Housing Corporation for "radication. "  This means 
144oaniel Goldrich, et . al . ,  "The Political Integration of 
Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru , "  (St . Louis : Social 
Science Institute, 1967 ) , 5 .  For an opposing view, see the work of 
University of Chile geographer , Pedro Cunill , Geograf{a de Chile, 
94 . 
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that the settlement has won a presumption of legal permanence from 
the government . 
Santo Domingo is one of the new Chilean government housing 
projects located along the periphery of the capital ' s  working-
class districts.  There are two maj or recruitment patterns in Santo 
Domingo . About 40 percent of the residents were successful appli­
cants ,  having approached the government or been approached as resi­
dents of callampas by government social workers and become enrolled. 
About 30 percent were either direct invaders of the project site 
or invaders of other government projects who won recognition of 
their desperate housing situation and were transferred into Santo 
Domingo . The remaining residents included relatives of the other­
wise qualif ied. 
Politicization in the callampas . As the following data collected 
in 1965 indicates (See Table 21) , the sample of Chilean shantytown 
residents show a significantly higher level of politicization then the 
sample of Mexican residents f�om Cornelius ' s  study. 145 Perhaps this 
may be explained by the fact that Cornelius did not pick his sample 
solely on the basis of shantytown residenc e .  One might expect a 
higher level of politicization among the permanent squatter settle­
ments and housing projects (from which the Chilean sample was taken) 
because the residents have had to anticipate dealing with the govern­
ment before entry; and the invasion preparations involve sophisticated 
planning with regard to mobilizing political support and immobilizing 
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Granting an apparently high level of politicization in 3 de Mayo 
and Santo Domingo , this does not mean the residents of these callampas 
must be radically inclined to pursue politically disruptive behavior . 
146Goldri· ch ,  et . 1 ' t  13 a • , op.  ci • , • 
l47 rbid . ,  io-11. 
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A high level of politicization is generally thought to be a necessary , 
but certainly not a sufficient , condition for political radicalism. 
In addition, the callampa residents must display low legitimacy 
orientations toward the Chilean political system. In fact a high 
politicization level accompanied by high legitimacy orientations would 
148 imply high system affection rather than system opposition. As the 
data in Table 22 indicates , legitimacy orientations among the resi-
dents of Santo Domingo and 3 de Mayo are certainly not low enough to 
suggest the proper conditions for political radicalism. In fact all 
of the items , with the possible exception of 2 . ,  imply relatively 
high legitimacy orientations in these two callampas . 
One note of caution must be inj ected, however. What the callampa 
residents have achieved individually and collectively within the past 
few years may be dissipated tomorrow. Much depends on whether they 
find some support in the society, and on their integration into the 
national society. If they do not find support , if neither their 
achievements nor they themselves win recognition and respect some-
where in the larger society, then the following consequences seem 
likely in the near future. Children, raised with much parental 
ambition and sacrifice, may fail to find the means to get ahead or 
become embarrassed about living in such settlements .  In either event , 
high intrafamilial tensions and a high level of frustration and self-
hate among the youth may resul t .  Thus,  the next gen�ration could · 
148Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment ,  op.  cit . ,  p .  14 . 
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Table 2 2149 
Patterns of Legitimacy 
Item Santo Domingo 3 de Mayo 
1 .  "In general our systems of 
government and politics is 
good for the country" : 
Agree strongly 65% 53% 
Agree slightly 21% 28% 
Disagree slightly/strongly 11% 15% 
2 .  Affiliation to a party: 
None/independent 35% 32% 
I Government* 43% 44% 
Opposition+ 18% 24% 
3 .  "Violence should never be the 
way to resolve political 
problems" : 
Agree strongly 75% 69% 
Agree slightly 12% 14% 
Disagree slightly/strongly 12% 15% 
4 .  "Social change is acceptable 
only if it doesn ' t  provoke 
disorder" :  
Agree strongly 80% 76% 
Agree slightly 15% 16% 
Disagree slightly/strongly 5% 6% 
* The government party is Christian Democracy in Chile 
+ The opposition coalition is the Socialist and Communist 
(FRAP) 
149Goldrich, et.  al . ,  op.  cit . ,  17 . 
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greatly raise the costs to the nation of malintegration of the 
settleme�ts,  either by venting their frustrations in political 
opposition or extreme privatization. 
In concluding the discussion focused on the local level ,  it 
might be well to add that consequences similar to those described 
in the preceding paragraph may characterize the Venezuelan situation 
in the future should the PCV and MIR adopt more suitable tactics 
to woe the barrio dwellers. This writer finds little, if any , 
evidence that shantytown dwellers in Venezuela and Chile have been 
politically radical during the 1960 ' s .  The 197 0 ' s  and 1980 ' s ,  
however , may be different . 
In order to test the conclusions reached through analysis of 
the local unit ,  this writer proposes to analyze national election 
data from Venezuela and Chile. Before doing so,  however, it might 
be helpful to have some understanding of the political party pro-
cess in Chile. (The important parties in Venezuelan politics have 
already been discussed . )  
Political Parties in Chile 
When discussing the strong French influence on Chilean political 
and cultural life, the late Arturo Alessandri and other prominent 
public leaders have invariably cited the large number of political 
parties. This small nation of nine million people, in fac t ,  outstrips 
its Gallic model in this respec t ;  the recent Chilean ·political spectrum 
has included as many as eleven parties having parliamentary representation. 150 
l50Roger S .  Abbot t ,  "The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in 
Chile , "  The American Political Science Review , (June , 1951) , 451. 
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A brief discussion of the maj or parties follows . 
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR UNIDO (PCV) . The United Conservative Party, 
the oldest and first ruling party in Chile,151 has traditionally been 
the party of the landed aristocracy and the wealthy . The forward to 
the 1961 PCV platform declared th�t the party ' s  "fundamental doctrine 
is in keeping with the teachings of the Church . "  The platform called 
for the removal of government from business and advocated a corporate 
152 state. Today the PCV continues to represent the economic elite 
and draws most of its strength from rural areas in the center of the 
country. 
PARTIDO LIBERAL (PL) . The Liberal Party had its origins in 
opposition to the authoritarian and ecclesiastical bias of the Conser-
vative Party. It came to power in 1861 and ruled securely until 1891 . 
Shortly thereafter, the religious issue disappeared and no significant 
difference remained between the Conservatives and Liberals . Today 
they are united with the Radical Party (�artido Radical) in a center-
right bloc. Traditionally, the Liberals have been the party of the 
wealthy industrialist and upper-middle classes, but in recent years 
they have been able to develop and maintain an electoral base in rural 
areas as well as urban areas. 153 
PARTIDO RADICAL (PR) . The Radical Party was formed in 1861 . 
151Federico G .  Gil , The Political System of Chile, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company , 1966), 245. 
152chile Election Factbook, September 4 ,  1964, (ICOPS) , 23. 
1 53Ibid . , 24 . 
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During its early years it displayed an orthodox 19th century liberal-
ism, but evolved slowly toward a collectivist orientation to meet 
the growth of popular movements during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. The Radical Party cooperated with the Alessandri 
government in the early 60 ' s ,  although it presented a candidate of 
its own in the 1958 elections . No other party in the Chilean poli-
tical system has had as varied a composition as the Radical Party. 
The PR includes northerners from the mining districts, southern land-
owners ,  small merchants , professionals ,  intellectuals , artisans , and 
many skilled workers . In the main, however , the characterization of 
the Radical Party as representative of middle-class urbanites holding 
white-collar j obs is accurate. 154 
PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO . (PDC) . The Radical Party forms the 
right wing of the Chilean Center ; the Christian Democratic Party , the 
lef t .  PDC evolved from a young branch of the Conservative Party 
influenced by Christian social ideas from Europe.  The PDC platform 
is strongly reformist in tone , stressing the needs of the poor and 
calling for corrective government action. The new party grew slowly 
during the Forties and early fifties; but in the 1963 municipal 
elections it led all other parties for the first time. The hard core 
of the PDC consists of Catholic members of the middle class. In 
addition efforts have been made to attract Protestant s ,  agnostics , 
atheists,  and Jews , in order to transmute the party into a genuine 
155 non-confessional movement . Led by Edwardo Frei Montalva , the 
154Gil , op . cit . ,  260-261. 
155For a general discussion of Christian Democracy see James Petras , 
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969), 197-255 . 
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Christian Democrats won the 1964 presidential election campaigning 
for a "Revolution in Freedom . "  
FRENTE DE ACCION POPULAR (FRAP) . The four parties of the left-
communist , Socialis t ,  National Democratic , and National Vanguard of 
the People are allied in the Popular Action Front (FRAP) . This 
coalition was established in February, 1956 , when the two major fac-
tions of Socialists,  the Labor Party (�artido del Trabaj o) , and a 
splinter of the Democratic Party j oined forces. Partido Socialists (PS) , 
which is composed of Marxists , humanistic socialists , and anarchs-
syndicalist s ,  has been marked by divisions within its ranks . At times 
it has cooperated with the Communist Party and at other times has 
bitterly opposed i t .  The party ' s  current program reflects its pre-
sent alliance with the Communist Party in FRAP . PS strength is rather 
evenly divided geographically, although in scattered provinces it 
receives no votes. The Partido Communista de Chile (�CCR) is the 
strongest and best organized Communist party in Latin America. 156 
Chile in contrast to other Latin American countries has given the 
Communist Party a great deal of freedom of operation. PCCH has been 
legal for most of its history and even when outlawed (1948-58) was 
not systematically persecuted . The principal theme of the PCCH pro-
gram is anti-imperialism, which it equates with anti-Americanism. 
The party calls for the expropriation of all foreign-owned enterprises . 
The principal Communist strongholds are the mining regions in the · 
Great North and Little North and the coal mining areas of Arauco in 
156Ernst Halpein, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, (Cam­
bridge, Mass . :  The M . I .T .  Press, 1965), 42 . 
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the Frontier region. The FRAP leader is Socialist Senator Salvador 
Allende Gossens. 
Analysis of Recent Elections in Venezuela and Chile 
The primary purpose of the following election analysis by state 
(Venezuela) and province (Chile) is to test the validity of the 
writer ' s  conclusions from the analysis of the local uni t .  The metho­
dology used will be quite simple. Radical voting patterns in areas 
with heavy in-migration will be compared with the patterns in out­
migration regions . If extreme leftist voting is much heavier in 
the receiving areas than in the areas of origin, then we may have 
some basis for believing that the migration experience is an important 
determinant in producing radical political attitudes and behavior. 
It  should be pointed out , however , that there is , at least, one big 
drawback to this type of analysi s .  Voting data from the receiving 
areas studied is , of course, a collection of both urban-born and 
migrant responses. The urban-born sample is probably quite small ,  
but may still be significant enough t o  affect the validity of any 
conclusions drawn from this analysis . Despite the problems , this 
breakdown may prove valuable as a guide to future researchers who 
might be interested in isolating the migrant population. It will be 
noted that the analysis will concentrate on the early and mid-196 0 ' s .  
This i s  due to the fact that more recent election statistics are not 
available . 
Recent Venezuelan Elections. Caracas (which is in the Federal 
District) is generally recognized as having one of the highest urbani-
101 
zation rates in Latin America. A large proportion of the migrants 
� 
to Caracas came from the state Bolivar , which is located in the 
Llanas Guayana interior. This interior region is essentially rural, 
still provincial and isolated in many parts , and has the lowest 
population density of all Venezuelan regions . 157 
It was mentioned earlier that the rural-urban migrants appear 
to have been most politically radical during 1958. Electoral data 
for the Federal District and Bolivar (See Table 23) support this 
Table 23158 
Communist Party Presidential Vote 







2 9 , 997 7 . 4% 
1 , 584 2 . 2% 
; 
contention. In fact the percent for Larrazabal in the Federal Dis-
trict (7 .4%) was the highest in all of the states and territories, 
/ 
while the percent for him in Bolivar was well below the average . 
It will be remembered that the PVC and the MIR called for a 
157John D .  Martz,  "The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 ,  1963 , 
(!COPS) , 4 .  
158venezuelan Elections of December 1 ,  1963 , Part III,  13.  
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boycott of the 1961 elections . However in the Federal District 
voter participation r o ·· - from 422 ,738 in 1958 to 478 ,466 in 1963. 159 
Also the winning AD cantli�ates in both the 1958 and 1963 elections 
(Betancourt in 1958 and Leoni in 1963) each polled about 14% of the 
vote in the Federal Distric t . 160 This evidence further substantiates 
the contention that the PCV-MIR boycott was not successful and that 
Venezuelan migrant radicalism was far less potent during the 196 0 ' s  
than during the 1950 ' s .  
Recent Chilean Elections . According to Bruce Herrick, Santiago 
has the highest rate of urbanization in Chile . 161 In addition about 
88% of the candidates for migration to Santiago came from the central 
162 third of the country. Thus we may conclude that area of origin 
, / for Santiago migrants includes the provinces of Valparaiso , Concepcion, 
� 163 and Coutin. As the following data indicates (See Table 24) the 
vote for Salvador Allende (The FRAP candidate) in 1964 was actually 
higher in two of the three areas of origin than it was in Santiago . 
In addition, a study of the 1952 Chilean national elections 
provides further evidence that the rural-to-urban migrants did not 
164 prefer Allende.  
159venezuelan Elections of December 1 ,  1963 , Part III,  12,  21.  
160Ibid . ,  21 . 
161 Herrick, op . cit . ,  30-31. 
162Ibid . ,  4 7 .  
163see map in The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4 ,  
1964 , Part II,  (!COPS , 1965) , 18 . 
164 
G .  Soares and R.  L .  Hamblin, op. cit . ,  1062 . 
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Table 24165 
Vote for Allende by Province in 1964 
Province % for Al lende 
Santiago 35 . 7 0  
Valparaiso 36 . 09 
, 
Concepcion 4 9 . 3 2  
/ 
Coutin 31.16 
This data, then, appears to affirm the evidence of high system 
affect among migrants from our analysis of the local unit in Chile . 
However, the reported substantial level of support for Dr.  Allende 
in the impending 1970 elections ; the resurgence of former President 
Allessandri ; the significant reforms as well as the failures of the 
Christian Democrats under President Frei since 1964 all await 
analysis following the outcome of what appears to be a very close 
Autumn 1970 election campaign. 
In conclusion it should be made clear however, that the next 
generation of Venezuelan and Chilean urban poor may break pattern of 
the 1950 ' s  and 60 ' s  and , in fac t ,  provide an important base fpr 
political radicalism in Latin America. 
165G .  Soares and R. L .  Hamblin, op . cit . ,  1062. 
Chapter V .  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper the writer has been concerned with economi c ,  
socio-psychological, and political factors which are important in 
determining the Latin American rural-to-urban migrant ' s  propensity 
to engage in radical political activity. In Chapter II our dis­
cussion, which covered the general Latin American setting, focused 
primarily on economic and socio-psychological factors although some 
data on political activity was also included. The last two chap­
ters, which included case studies of Mexico , Venezuela, and Chile , 
were primarily concerned with the political process ,  particularly 
the political party process ,  and the migrant ' s  relation to it.  
Generally this material was structured in such a way to demon­
strate the invalidity of the Latin American "migrant radicalization" 
theories . Using the English language research material and data 
which is now available ,  it is the writer ' s  contention that this 
objective has been achieved insofar as the period of the 19SO ' s  and 
1960 ' s  is concerned . 
All of the data which bear on the "economic frustration" theory 
indicate that the amount of economic frustration which actually · 
exists is far less than enough to substantiate this theory . This 'is 
particularly demonstrated by the data on migrant unemployment. 
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It was also found that migrants have very few socio-psychological 
adjustment problems . The fact is that (1) most migrants have had 
some exposure to the urban environment previous to moving to the city, 
(2) most migrants do not suffer from social isolation, and (3) most 
migrants preserve strong family and kinship ties in the urban complex. 
Indices of politicization and legitimacy orientations (See the 
case studies of Mexico and Chile . )  generally point to the fact that 
there is very little evidence of migrant alienation from the political 
system for the time being . 
And finally , a study of radical voting patterns and support for 
protest demonstrations (See the material on Mexico . )  yields no basis 
for the contention that the political alienation which does exist is 
converted into radical political action. This writer found only one 
imp<.,rtant exception and this was the case of the Venezuelan migrants 
leftist support in 1958. 
In addition, two other propositions have been formulated by 
this writer as a result of his research. (1) When the migrants do 
engage in radical a�tivity , they are usually "the led", instead of 
"the leaders" . (The best recent example is that of the middle-class 
PCV leaders who mobilized the migrants in 1958 . Historically, we 
I 
may point :;o Peron in Argentina and Odria in Peru, who were both 
successful in gaining migrant support . )  For this reason, it follows 
that when the leaders are not to be found , the migrants are likely 
t·o remain radically inactive. 
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(2) The bulk of the evidence . indicates that the group we have 
defined as the "marginals" are much more likely to be radical acti­
vists than the migrants themselves . Marginals ,  when compared with 
the migrants, combine a higher politicization level with a lower 
system affection level . This means the marginal is much more unhappy 
with the existing system and also more likely to know what to do about 
expressing his displeasure. Also, although virtually no data presently 
exists to test this , there is strong reason to believe that the second 
generation in the urban slums possess an even greater radical poten­
tial which may well be activated in the future . First, this second 
generation will not be able to compare his present status with the 
poor conditions in the rural areas as their parents were able to do . 
Thus it is logical to expect that they will feel more relatively de­
prived than their parent s .  Add t o  this the fact that this new 
generation is likely to receive a far superior education to that of 
their parents ,  and thus will probably be far more highly politicized. 
The result is a potentially very explosive situation for the future. 
On the basis of the preceding observations, this writer contends 
that a much more reasonable theory than that proposed by migrant 
radicalization theorists may be suggested. This theory is based 
historically on stages. 
Theory by stages.  In the earliest stage from 1930 to 1950 
(possibly from 1930 to 1960 for the case of Venezuela) the rural-to­
urban migrant may have contributed to the radicalization of Latin 
American politic s ,  reflected in various successful and abortive 
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revolutions and changes of regime . 166 For example , this period saw 
, , 
the rise of Accion Democratica in Venezuela , of Getulio Vargas in 
� Brazil and Peron in Argentir.a.  Although, to this writer ' s  knowledge, 
data substantiating this point has not yet been gathered , the evi-
dence available implies that these movements had a large migrant 
base. 167 
The second stage (the· one this paper has focused on) from 1950 
to 1970 (1960 to 1970 for Venezuela) has been one characterized by 
little radical activity among the migrants.  Although one can only 
speculate, it appears that this period has not seen the dynamic 
leaders needed to mobilize the migrants and that the migrants are 
not yet ready to lead themselve s .  
However , it i s  possible, in fact quite likely, that there will 
be a third stage in this proces s .  In this stage the second genera-
tion (the migrant ' s  children) may well begin to produce their own 
leaders who will mobilize the masses for radical political activity. 
Obviously this theory is far too incomplete to serve as an 
explanatory device (and in this sense might more appropriately be 
called a series of propositions) ; however, the primary purpose for 
outl: .. ing it is to offer suggestions for future research. 
Further suggestions for future research . This writer, as he 
researched this topic on the political effects of rural-to-urban 
migration, was constantly aware of the need for more survey data on 
166ttobsbawn in Veliz, op. cit . ,  6 5 .  
167 See, for example , Robert J .  Alexander , The Peron Era, (New 
York: Russell and Russell, Inc . ,  1965) , 7-8. 
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the political attitudes and behavior of Latin American migrants .  
In this respec t ,  several suggestions may be made for the benefit of 
future analysts who are able to do original surveys in this area. 
Firs t ,  it seems much more must be done in determining legitimacy 
orientations (the level of system affect) of the migrants ,  particu­
larly at the local level (as in the two settlements in Chile) . 
Certainly to arrive at the base of the study of system instability 
one must analyze the populous ' s  attitude toward the system, for 
obviously that attitude will shape the individual ' s  political be­
havior . Also, better indices (than voting behavior) must be created 
to gather evidence of political radicalism. A step in the right 
direction might be to gather more data bearing on an existent �ndex 
preference for and support for protest demonstrations. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that data gathered in 
the future may very well invalidate the conclusio�s reached here; 
however , at present it appears that during the period roughly from 
1950 to 1970, Latin American migrants have not been an important 
force for political radicalism. 
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